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Abstract
In this technical report we describe an approach for verifying cryptographic protocol implementa-
tions written in C. We statically prove the correctness of these implementations with the general pur-
pose verifier VeriFast. More concretely we prove: memory safety, the absence of explicit and implicit
information leaks, and functional correctness which includes protocol integrity. Our invariant-based
approach requires an extension of the symbolic model of cryptography in order to work for protocol
implementations in C written against an existing cryptographic API. Compared to the state of our
work in March 2016, as described in TR CW694, we have significantly overhauled our approach, in
order to remove a number of unsoundnesses as well as lift a number of limitations.
1 Introduction
We almost cannot imagine our everyday lives anymore without a connection to the Internet.
From managing your bank accounts to staying in touch with your friends: we heavily rely on
this massive piece of technology. In order to provide a secure environment for these day-to-day
activities, web browsers and the web servers they communicate with use cryptography.
In this technical report, we describe an approach to proving the correctness of such cryp-
tographic software written in the C programming language. Our approach, depicted in Fig-
ure 1, allows to verify cryptographic protocol implementations. Such an implementation is a
software realization of a particular communication pattern that establishes a certain security
goal (e.g. the authentication of a request) using cryptographic primitives (e.g. key genera-
tion and encryption). Each protocol participant is assigned a specific role and different roles
are implemented separately as, for instance, distinct C functions like the functions A and
B from Figure 1. Together, these roles make up a protocol implementation. Assuming the
cryptographic primitives are perfect, we prove that the implementation of such a protocol is
memory safe, does not leak secrets and indeed achieves its security goals.
The approach we developed builds on top of the work from [9], and is similar to the
approaches proposed in [2] and [6]: use a general purpose program verifier to verify protocol
implementations that are written against a trusted API containing the cryptographic primi-
tives. First, the semantics of the functions in this API are specified through contracts (i.e. the
pre- and postconditions in Figure 1) which are assumed correct. Then, the corresponding ver-
ification methodology can use these contracts to reason about the protocol implementations
(refinement type checking in [2] and symbolic execution in [6]).
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void enc(...)
//@ PRE
//@ POST
{
...
}
...
void dec(...)
//@ PRE
//@ POST
{
...
}
...
void A(...)
//@ PRE
//@ POST
{
...
}
void B(...)
//@ PRE
//@ POST
{
...
}
M1
M2
Mn
. . .
Target Target
Assumed correct Assumed correct
Figure 1: Overview of our approach for verifying cryptographic protocols
The cryptographic API in both [2] and [6] is designed in such a way that verification of
the protocols within the symbolic model of cryptography is directly possible. In the symbolic
model all messages are terms of a cryptographic algebra. The cryptographic primitives con-
struct messages in this algebra and pairing/unpairing operators allow to compose/decompose
messages. For this reason the cryptographic API in both [2] and [6] contains, besides the
cryptographic primitives, functions to compose and decompose messages, and the network
API accepts and returns these messages. The contracts of all the functions in the resulting
API then allow to track the symbolic message content of memory regions during verification.
More importantly however, the contracts of the network API enable the enforcement of a
network invariant for messages allowed on the network. This network invariant is key to
proving functional correctness and security of protocol implementations.
A crucial difference with our approach is that we target protocol implementations that
employ preexisting cryptographic libraries. PolarSSL and the more widely known OpenSSL
are two examples of such preexisting libraries that provide the required cryptographic func-
tionality for writing protocol implementations and both contain a large protocol suite of their
own. For now we focus on custom protocol implementations, but we see no reason that our
approach would not work for preexisting protocol implementations as well. Since we tar-
get protocols that use preexisting libraries we do not have the liberty to design the trusted
cryptographic API as we see fit. We are stuck with their accompanying APIs and most
cryptographic libraries do not have a structured message concept such as is necessary for the
approaches described in [2] and [6]. Instead, they leave it up to the protocol implementation
to compose and parse messages using C buffers and C functions like memcpy and memcmp.
Our primary goal was to devise a technique that enabled us to verify protocol implemen-
tations that are written against a preexisting cryptographic API. Although in such a setting
the symbolic model could not be directly applied as in [2] or [6], we aspired to use a similar
symbolic reasoning. Therefore we introduced an extension of the symbolic model of cryp-
tography. This extended model enables verification of protocol code that itself implements
the composing and parsing of messages. It allows to associate symbolic cryptographic values
with bit strings present in memory, and to keep track of these values while composing and
parsing messages. In turn, the contracts of the functions in a cryptographic API can express
associations between input and output buffers to functions on the one hand, and the symbolic
result of cryptographic primitives on the other hand.
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1. A→ B: AuthEnc(kx,mx)
2. B → A: AuthEnc(kx, {mx, f(mx)})
Figure 2: A confidential RPC protocol
The rest of this report starts with some background on invariant-based verification of
cryptographic protocols within the symbolic model in Section 2. Next, we introduce our
extended symbolic model in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we show how to apply the extended
model with a complete example. We give our results in Section 5 and finally we conclude
this report in Section 6.
2 The Symbolic Model and Invariants
Before diving into the explanation of our extended symbolic model in Section 3, we first give
some background on the verification of cryptographic protocols. In Section 2.1 we introduce a
confidential Remote Procedure Call (RPC) protocol so we can immediately give concrete ex-
amples when we discuss different mechanism to state and show properties of protocols. Then,
in Section 2.2, we discuss the symbolic model of cryptography. The symbolic model was first
introduced in [5] as a tool to reason about protocols that used asymmetric encryption. It
has since become a widespread instrument to reason about all kinds of cryptographic proto-
cols. The simplicity of a term-based algebra together with some rules to define derivability of
terms enables abstract reasoning about confidentiality properties without getting tangled up
with implementation details. Another technique often used to state and show properties of
cryptographic protocols are events or event predicates [2, 3, 4, 8]. We will call them events in
Section 2.3 and correspondences between events allow to express integrity properties. A final
mechanism we discuss in Section 2.4 to show protocol correctness are invariants [2, 3, 4, 6, 8].
More specifically we use network invariants to constrain what messages are allowed on the
network and we call these public messages. We illustrate how to combine invariants with
other introduced techniques in order to proof integrity and confidentiality properties.
2.1 A confidential RPC protocol
In Figure 2 the protocol transcript of a confidential Remote Procedure Call (RPC) protocol
is shown that represents a single communication session. For a given confidential request
message mx, principal A wants to know the confidential response f(mx) for some function f
that only principal B can compute.
As a first step in the protocol, principal A constructs the message AuthEnc(kx,mx) by
using the key kx and the cryptographic primitive for authenticated symmetric encryption.
Then principal A sends this message on the network for principal B to receive. After principal
B has received this message, he uses the primitive for authenticated decryption to simulta-
neously check authenticity and retrieve mx. Principal B then computes the result f(mx)
and in turn constructs the message AuthEnc(kx, {mx, f(mx)}). Next, principal A receives
this message from B via the network. He also uses the authenticated decryption primitive
to finally retrieve f(mx) and check the authenticity of this response. Principal A must also
check that the response message f(mx) he got was indeed for the request message mx and
not actually f(m) for some other request message m.
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The intermediary steps taken by the protocol participants to correctly implement the
confidential RPC protocol are left implicit in the protocol transcript, so protocol transcripts
do not tell the full story. There are also some assumptions left implicit in the protocol
transcript for this protocol to work such as the key kx should be only known to principal A
and B and both principals should keep it secret, and the freshness1 of the request message
mx is not important to principal B.
2.2 The symbolic model
In the symbolic model of cryptography we identify any constructible message with an element
t from some term algebra T. If we denote with m an element from the set of raw messages
M and with k a key from the set of keys K, an example of such a term algebra is given by:
t ::= m | k | {t, t} |AuthEnc(k, t)
In the symbolic model one also introduces the notion of derivability of messages for the
chosen term algebra2. A derivable term is a term known by the attacker and we will denote
with btc that a term t is derivable by the attacker. Confidentiality of a message can then
be expressed in terms of the corresponding term not being derivable. Assuming that the set
keysatt contains the keys initially known by the attacker and that the set msgsatt contains
the raw messages that are guessable by the attacker3, the following rules partially define
derivability of terms in our algebra:
k ∈ keysatt
bkc
m ∈ msgsatt
bmc
b{t1, t2}c
bt1c
b{t1, t2}c
bt2c
bt1c bt2c
b{t1, t2}c
bkc btc
bAuthEnc(k, t)c
bAuthEnc(k, t)c bkc
btc
The attacker in the symbolic model has full control over the network. Full control means
intercepting any message from the network and putting any message on the network that
can be derived with terms known to the attacker. So the attacker can replace any message
that is sent on the network during a protocol run with another. To take this into account the
definition of attacker derivability is completed with a protocol specific rule for each message
exchanged in a protocol run. This rule encodes the steps that a principal takes to construct
the corresponding message and these steps may of course depend on earlier messages he found
on the network which is under control of the attacker. To give a concrete example, here are
the two rules that complete the definition of attacker derivability for the confidential RPC
protocol from Section 2.1 given the key kx, the request message mx and the set keysB of keys
known by principal B (so definitely kx ∈ keysB):
1 An attacker can resend a request message he previously grabbed from the network and principal B has
no means to detect this unless he records previous requests. If this situation is undesirable or can even cause
a security breach in some particular application, the presented protocol is not suitable.
2 This is often established with extra kinds of terms and equality axioms; for example introducing AuthDec
terms requires an axiom saying decrypting an encrypted message with the same key, results in the original
message: ∀k, t. AuthDec(k,AuthEnc(k, t)) = t. We chose not to have such terms and axioms, but to embed
these properties directly into the definition of derivability.
3 An implicit assumption here is that keys of honest principals and expected secrets of protocol runs are
not members of the sets keysatt or msgsatt as the attacker can then trivially derive them.
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bAuthEnc(kx,mx)c
[1. A→ B] bAuthEnc(k,m)c k ∈ keysBbAuthEnc(k, {m, f(m)})c [2. B → A]
4
Given this complete definition of attacker derivability for the confidential RPC protocol
we can now already state two security goals concerning confidentiality given mx:
• The request message mx is confidential, i.e. bmxc is not derivable
• The response message f(mx) is confidential, i.e. bf(mx)c is not derivable
Both these properties are further on proven in Section 2.4.
2.3 Events and event correspondences
Another security goal of the confidential RPC protocol from Section 2.1, besides the confi-
dentiality properties discussed in Section 2.2, is the integrity of both messages sent. With
integrity of the first message we mean that principal B should only accept a request message
from the network if principal A (or some other principal with whom B shares a key which
we ignore here) indeed sent it. Integrity of the second message implies that A only accepts
the response message if it is indeed a response from B to A’s request.
Integrity properties can be expressed through correspondences between protocol events.
Events are protocol-dependent and each event indicates that some principal has taken a
specific step in the protocol run. A complete protocol run then generates a list or trace
of events [8]. Event correspondences are then expressed through properties of all possible
protocol traces. While other events could be identified, we define four custom events for the
example protocol from Section 2.1:
A→1 (m): Principal A decided to send the request message m.
B←1 (m): Principal B accepted the request message m.
B→2 (m): Principal B decided to send the response message f(m).
A←2 (m): Principal A accepted the response message f(m).
The two event correspondences that denote the integrity of the example protocol are then:
∀m. B←1 (m) ⇒ A→1 (m) ∀m. A←2 (m) ⇒ B→2 (m)
An intuitive account of the events for the confidential RPC protocol from Section 2.1 is
shown in Figure 3. Consider an application running on host A that needs the computation
f with m as input, but f(m) can only be computed by an application running on host B.
Both applications run within the corresponding application layers of the relevant host and
the confidential RPC protocol itself is implemented in a lower layer of the (network) protocol
stack on both hosts. The initial event A→1 (m) can then be considered as an invocation of
protocol role A for m by the application running on host A. The event B←1 (m) in turn signals
that the implementation of role B accepted the request message m as genuine and it unblocks
the application on host B that was waiting for some m to compute the result f(m). Once
it has successfully calculated f(m) the application continues the implementation of principal
B by handing it the result f(m) which corresponds to the event B→2 (m). The last event
4 We assume here that principal B is ready to respond to request messages from all the principals with
whom he shares a key in the set keysB . Moreover, we assume principal B knows which key to use on receiving
a message from the network or that he tries all the keys from the set keysB .
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Application layer
Protocol implementation
Application layer
Protocol implementation
A B
A→1 (m)A←2 (m) B→2 (m)B←1 (m)
1.AuthEnc(k,m)
2.AuthEnc(k, {m, f(m)})
Figure 3: Overview of events and messages on the network for the protocol from Figure 2.
A←2 (m) finally occurs when the implementation of role A accepts the response message f(m)
as genuine. The application on host A can now be unblocked, it receives the result f(m)
from the protocol implementation and continues its execution.
In order to define correct network invariants in Section 2.4, we restrict the set of possible
events to contain only initial and final events. The occurrence of an initial event (e.g. A→1 (m)
or B→2 (m)) is determined before a protocol run starts and their occurrence is independent
from the execution of the protocol. Initial events can be seen as preconditions for a protocol
run to advance. Final events correspond to termination of a principal implementation (e.g.
B←1 (m) and A←2 (m)) so their occurrence depends on the execution steps taken by the pro-
tocol participants. Final events can be interpreted as postconditions that hold on successful
termination of protocol participants.
Having defined protocol-specific events for the confidential RPC protocol, the protocol-
specific part of the definition of attacker derivability has to be updated accordingly. Taking
the initial events into account, the two rules below now complete the definition of attacker
derivability given the key kx:
A→1 (m)
bAuthEnc(kx,m)c
[1. A→ B] B
→
2 (m) bAuthEnc(k,m)c k ∈ keysB
bAuthEnc(k, {m, f(m)})c [2. B → A]
The two confidentiality goals for the RPC protocol then become:
∀m. A→1 (m) ∧ B→2 (m)⇒ ¬bmc ∀m. A→1 (m) ∧ B→2 (m)⇒ ¬bf(m)c
We have now dealt with initial events, but still need to express when the final events of the
confidential RPC protocol occur. The following two statements encode when principal A,
respectively principal B, is willing to accept a message from the network as genuine:
∀k,m. bAuthEnc(k,m)c ∧ k ∈ keysB ⇒ B←2 (m)
∀m. bAuthEnc(kx, {m, f(m)})c ∧A→1 (m)⇒ A←2 (m)
2.4 Network invariants and public messages
In Section 2.2 we introduced attacker derivability as a way to state and reason about con-
fidentiality properties. The definition of derivability as we presented it there is protocol-
specific, implementation-dependent and can become quite complex for interesting protocols.
Therefore, and to help us prove that some term is not derivable, we introduce an additional
mechanism to help us reason about what the attacker knows: network invariants.
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Within the symbolic model, a network invariant divides the terms of the chosen algebra
into two disjoint sets: public terms and nonpublic terms. These invariants are protocol
dependent and a good invariant ensures that all terms that must be published on the network
in a protocol run are indeed public. This ensures that honest principals never violate the
network invariant. Moreover the invariant must be closed under attacker actions; i.e. for any
set of public terms, the attacker should only be able to derive new terms that are also public.
This ensures that the attacker can never violate the network invariant. Once established
that nobody can violate the chosen invariant, confidentiality of a term can then be proven
by showing that the term is not public. This reasoning about derivability and public terms
can be made more precise. For some chosen invariant I, first we must prove ∀t. btc ⇒ I(t)
to show that I indeed allows protocol progress and is closed under attacker actions. Next, to
prove the confidentiality of some term tsec, it is sufficient to prove ¬I(tsec).
Thus given the key kx for a protocol run of the confidential RPC protocol from Section 2.1,
a suitable invariant must ensure that all messages exchanged by principal A and B are public
according to the invariant. For any proposed invariant I it must be so that A→1 (m) ⇒
I(AuthEnc(kx,m)) and B
→
2 (m) ⇒ I(AuthEnc(kx, {(m, f(m)})). As mentioned before, a
suitable invariant must also be closed under attacker actions. For the term algebra from
Section 2.2 a proposed invariant I is closed under attacker actions if it satisfies:
∀k ∈ keysatt. I(k) ∀m ∈ keysatt. I(m) ∀t1, t2. I(t1) ∧ I(t2) ⇔ I({t1, t2})
∀k, t. I(k) ∧ I(t) ⇒ I(AuthEnc(k, t))
Given the key kx, we can now define a suitable invariant for some term t by recursion on t:
IRPC(t) ≡

m ∈ msgsatt (if t = m)
k ∈ keysatt (if t = k)
IRPC(t1) ∧ IRPC(t2) (if t = {t1, t2})
(IRPC(k) ∧ IRPC(t′)) ∨
∃m. (A→1 (m) ∧ t′ = m ∧ k = kx) ∨
∃m,mf . (B→2 (m) ∧ t′ = {m,mf} ∧
mf = f(m) ∧ k ∈ keysB)) (if t = AuthEnc(k, t′))
Equipped with this invariant we can now finally prove the desired confidentiality and integrity
properties of the confidential RPC protocol. We first show show that our chosen invariant is
a useful one by proving Theorem 2.1. Theorem 2.2 then gives us the desired confidentiality
properties and Theorem 2.3 the earlier stated integrity properties.
Theorem 2.1. Derivable terms respect the chosen invariant: ∀t. btc ⇒ IRPC(t)
Proof. For some t, induction on the derivation of btc allows to show IRPC(t) in all cases.
Theorem 2.2. Confidentiality property: ∀m. A→1 (m) ∧ B→2 (m)⇒ ¬bmc ∧ ¬bf(m)c
Proof. For any m assuming A→1 (m) ∧B→2 (m) ∧ (bmc ∨ bf(m)c) and using Theorem 2.1 and
the definition of IRPC(t) leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 2.3. Integrity property: ∀m. (B←1 (m)⇒ A→1 (m)) ∧ (A←2 (m)⇒ B→2 (m))
Proof. For any m assuming B←1 (m)∧¬A→1 (m) and using Theorem 2.1 and the definition for
B←1 (m) and IRPC(t) leads to a contradiction. Similarly, assuming A←2 (m) ∧ ¬B→2 (m) leads
to a contradiction.
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3 The Extended Symbolic Model in VeriFast
Here, we discuss our extended symbolic model of cryptography which is based on the symbolic
model and its associated techniques discussed in Section 2. Since we encoded this model
directly in VeriFast5 (a formal definition with a soundness proof in the random oracle model [1]
is currently being developed), it is instructive to familiarize yourself with general verification
in VeriFast before you continue reading [7, 10]. The encoding of our extended symbolic model
depends on various concepts from this general purpose verifier for C programs. So in the rest
of this text, basic knowledge about verification with VeriFast is assumed.
In the outline of our approach here we focus on the generation of random values (i.e. sym-
metric keys and random nonces), hashing and symmetric authenticated encryption. Since
the semantics of regular symmetric encryption are inherently more complex, we postpone
its discussion to Appendix A. Our approach deals with asymmetric encryption and signa-
tures in a very similar way as regular symmetric encryption and they are not discussed in
this text. The full encoding of our extended symbolic model in VeriFast is available in the
examples/crypto ccs directory of the latest VeriFast release. This encoding also deals
with keyed hashes, asymmetric encryption and signatures.
Now, we will introduce our extended symbolic model of cryptography step-by-step. We
start by showing a template for a verified protocol in Section 3.1. While this template does
not yet introduce any concepts or definitions from our extended symbolic model, it will be
useful while explaining later definitions. Then, in Section 3.2, we give the definitions to
track principal identities during symbolic execution. Each function implementing (part of)
a protocol role will need such an identity as a permission to invoke specific other functions
from the cryptographic API (e.g. for generating a random value). Next we show how verified
protocol code can actually send bytes on the network in Section 3.3. For this we chose the
fairly standard (i.e. comparable to the sys/socket.h header from POSIX) network API of
PolarSSL6 and augmented it with VeriFast contracts to specify its semantics. Note that any
other network API for C could be used as well provided it is augmented with analogous con-
tracts. Subsequently in Section 3.4 we discuss how we represent cryptographic information;
i.e. memory contents produced by the cryptographic primitive implementations. This is a
fundamental aspect of our extended symbolic model. The representation of cryptographic in-
formation ensures that the caller of a cryptographic primitive does not automatically have the
permission to read from the corresponding memory region. This prevents secret information
from leaking into regular program variables or into the program’s control flow. Section 3.4
also discusses that to get read permissions to such a memory region, one has to prove that it
does not contain any secrets. In Section 3.5 then, we describe how we symbolically represent
the result of the cryptographic primitives. We call these symbolic results cryptograms and
they are essential to give meaningful contracts to the relevant PolarSSL cryptographic prim-
itive implementations in Section 3.6. The rationale for choosing PolarSSL here is that it is a
lightweight, and thus relatively simple cryptographic library as it targets the embedded mar-
ket. Again a different cryptographic API for C could be used instead, as long as the contracts
are analogous to the ones shown in Section 3.6. How to prove that a memory region directly
produced by some cryptographic primitive does not contain any secrets in order to get read
5VeriFast: https://github.com/verifast/verifast
6PolarSSL (recently rebranded to mbed TLS): https://tls.mbed.org/
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permissions to it, is explained in Section 3.7. We use an invariant-based approach for these
proofs as introduced in Section 2, very similar to [2] and [6]. The main difference is that we
enforce this invariant on cryptographic information in readable memory regions, instead of
on messages on the network. These invariants as in Section 2 are also the key mechanism to
prove security properties of protocol implementations. Our attacker model then, is defined in
Section 3.8 and finally, we conclude in Section 3.9 with a discussion of an induction principle
for cryptograms which allows the verification of recursive cryptographic protocols.
3.1 Verified protocol template
A template for a two-party protocol is shown in Listing 1. This template does not yet intro-
duce any concepts or definitions from our extended symbolic model itself and it is completely
understandable with the explanations from the VeriFast Tutorial [7]. It will however, be very
helpful in explaining all the definitions that follow. We will gradually explain how to fill in
this template in order to end up with a verified protocol.
The two roles from the protocol template from Listing 1 are implemented as indefinitely
repeated distinct threads of the same application on the same host. However, after having
verified a filled in template within our extended symbolic model, the two roles can be dis-
tributed over different hosts without violating the properties proven during verification and
they will be secure under our attacker model and multiple concurrent runs. To fill in this
template, the code that implements the different protocol roles should be placed in the two
functions role1 and role2. If this code requires access to some specific resources, the argu-
ment lists of role1 and role2 and also their contracts have to be updated accordingly. The
updated contracts of both these functions should not only give the implementing code the
necessary permissions, it should also encode the security properties of the protocol at hand.
How to encode these properties is gradually explained throughout this text.
Before we continue the discussion of the template from Listing 1, it is instructive to look
at a small example of a partially filled in template. Listing 2 shows such an example where
role1 requires an argument arg and the permission perm. The example illustrates that for
each role the bodies of the predicate instances pthread_run_pre and pthread_run_post
should be updated to reflect the chosen argument list and contract for the corresponding
C function. Also the call to function role1 in role1_t has to be adjusted accordingly.
Both the predicate instances pthread_run_pre and pthread_run_post and the function
role1_t are defined here because of the way that VeriFast deals with threading and are not
further discussed (see [7] for more details).
After launching the attacker thread, the main function from the template in Listing 1
invokes both protocol roles as different threads inside an infinite loop. The loop does not
wait for these threads to join in order to allow multiple concurrent executions of the protocol
and it uses two leak statements to cleanup the symbolic heap. Finally, the last step in
filling out this template is to set up the right context (which will be protocol-dependent,
e.g. generating a key shared among protocol roles) in the loop of the main function before
launching the different threads. After all these steps (not necessarily in discussed order),
and after having verified the filled in template, the result is a verified cryptographic protocol
implementation.
9
void role1()
//@ requires true;
//@ ensures true;
{ /* ... */ }
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(role1_t)
(void *data, any info) = info == none;
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(role1_t)
(void *data, any info) = info == none;
@*/
void *role1_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(role1_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(data, _);
role1();
//@ close pthread_run_post(role1_t)(data, _);
return 0;
}
void role2()
//@ requires true;
//@ ensures true;
{ /* ... */ }
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(role2_t)
(void *data, any info) = info == none;
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(role2_t)
(void *data, any info) = info == none;
@*/
void *role2_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(role2_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(role2_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(role2_t)(data, _);
role2();
//@ close pthread_run_post(role2_t)(data, _);
return 0;
}
int main(void)
//@ requires true;
//@ ensures true;
{
// ... create a thread that executes the attacker implementation
while (true)
//@ invariant true;
{
pthread_t t1, t2;
//@ close pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(NULL, none);
//@ close pthread_run_pre(role2_t)(NULL, none);
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, &role1_t, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, &role2_t, NULL);
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, role1_t, NULL, none);
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, role2_t, NULL, none);
}
}
Listing 1: A template for a verified two-party protocol
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//@ predicate perm() = true /* &*& ... */;
void role1(int arg)
//@ requires perm();
//@ ensures perm();
{ /* ... */ }
struct args{ int arg; };
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(void *args, any info) =
args_arg(args, ?val) &*& info == some(val) &*& perm();
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(role1_t)(void *args, any info) =
args_arg(args, ?val) &*& info == some(val) &*& perm();
@*/
void *role1_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(role1_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(data, _);
role1(((struct args*) data)->arg);
//@ close pthread_run_post(role1_t)(data, _);
return 0;
}
Listing 2: Example of a filled in template for one protocol role
3.2 Tracking identities of principals
As part of our model, each function that implements a protocol role will need an identity
to invoke specific functions from the trusted cryptographic API. This identity is not only
a permission to generate random values (see Section 3.6) or to perform unauthenticated
decryption (see Appendix A), it also allows us to link generated random values to the identity
of the creator. During the verification of, according to our model, misbehaving protocol code,
a permission can be revoked in order to prevent the code from unnoticeably undermining its
own security goals. This mechanism is explained in Appendix A.
The definitions for tracking principal identities during verification are shown in Listing 3.
For clarity, the different permissions that an identity comprises are defined separately as the
predicates random_permission and decryption_permission. A principal identity then
is defined in terms of these permissions, as a chunk of the predicate principal. Its first
argument is the sequence number in the line of generated identities to ensure uniqueness.
The second argument keeps track of how many random values are generated for the princi-
pal. The predicate principals is used to keep track of how many identities are generated
thus far as indicated by its only argument. To retrieve the permission for generating iden-
tities (i.e. a chunk of the predicate principals), the lemma principals_init should be
invoked. The precondition of this lemma uses the module system of VeriFast (notice the
require_module declaration) to ensure that the lemma can only be invoked once in order
to prevent the recycling of identities. How exactly this module system works is not explained
here, but illustrative examples can be found in the latest VeriFast release. With the permis-
sion for generating identities, one can start creating new identities by invoking the lemma
principal_create.
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/*@
predicate decryption_permission(int principal;);
predicate random_permission(int principal, int generated_values;);
predicate principal(int principal, int generated_values;) =
decryption_permission(principal) &*&
random_permission(principal, generated_values)
;
predicate principals(int count);
require_module principals_mod;
lemma void principals_init();
requires module(principals_mod, true);
ensures principals(0);
lemma int principal_create();
requires principals(?count);
ensures principals(count + 1) &*& result == count + 1 &*&
principal(count + 1, 0);
@*/
Listing 3: Tracking principal identities and corresponding permissions
Listing 4 illustrates how to use these definitions by showing a fragment of the template
from Section 3.1 that has been partially filled in. The contract of role1 reflects that this
implementation of a protocol role needs access to a principal identity. Important to note
here is that each piece of protocol code should only have access to one principal identity.
Otherwise a misbehaving piece of protocol code which gets some of its identity permissions
revoked (e.g. to prevent further usage of unauthenticated decryption, see Appendix A), can
still fall back to another identity. This would make our encoding of the extended symbolic
model in VeriFast unsound and is therefore not allowed in our approach. The main function in
Listing 4 gets the permission to generate identities by invoking the lemma principals_init
and generates two principal identities before launching the protocol. After the protocol has
finished the identity permissions are cleaned up through leak statements.
3.3 The network API
An extract from the annotated network API is shown in Listing 5. The C functions shown
are obtained from the network API of PolarSSL and they form a classical socket API. Speci-
fications added to these C functions ensure that verified code uses them in a correct fashion.
For brevity, only the C functions to establish a connection at client-side are shown. The
functions and contracts for server-side connections are analogous.
To establish a connection, a client first has to call the net_connect function with the
correct arguments. If successful (i.e. the result of the call is equal to zero), the client receives a
chunk of the predicate net_status. As the postcondition of net_connect indicates the third
argument of this chunk will be connection_init. This reflects the fact that the initialization
of the socket is not complete after only calling net_connect, since the communication type
still has to be set to blocking or non-blocking. So the final step in initializing a client socket
is calling net_set_block. For simplicity we only support blocking communication, but non-
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//@ import_module principals_mod;
void role1()
//@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values);
//@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values);
{
//@ open principal(p1, random_values);
/* ... */
//@ close principal(p1, _);
}
int main(void)
//@ requires module(template, true);
//@ ensures true;
{
//@ open_module();
//@ principals_init();
// ... create a thread that executes the attacker implementation
while (true)
//@ invariant principals(_);
{
//@ int p1 = principal_create();
//@ int p2 = principal_create();
// ... launch protocol role threads
//@ leak principal(p1, _);
//@ leak principal(p2, _);
}
}
Listing 4: Illustration of using the definitions for principal identities
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/*@
inductive socket_status =
| bound_to_port | connection_init | connected;
predicate net_status(int socket, list<char> address,
int socket_port, socket_status status);
@*/
int net_connect(int *socket, const char *host, int port);
//@ requires integer(socket, _) &*& [?f]option_string(host, ?h);
/*@ ensures integer(socket, ?socket_v) &*&
[f]option_string(host, h) &*&
result != 0 ? true :
net_status(socket_v, h, port, connection_init); @*/
int net_set_block(int socket);
//@ requires net_status(socket, ?h, ?port, connection_init);
/*@ ensures result != 0 ? true :
net_status(socket, h, port, connected) ; @*/
int net_send(void *socket, const char *buf, size_t len);
/*@ requires integer(socket, ?socket_v) &*&
net_status(socket_v, ?ip, ?port, connected) &*&
len <= MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE &*&
[?f1]chars(buf, len, ?cs); @*/
/*@ ensures integer(socket, socket_v) &*&
net_status(socket_v, ip, port, connected) &*&
[f1]chars(buf, len, cs); @*/
int net_recv(void *socket, char *buf, size_t len);
/*@ requires integer(socket, ?socket_v) &*&
net_status(socket_v, ?ip, ?port, connected) &*&
chars(buf, len, _) &*& len <= MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE; @*/
/*@ ensures integer(socket, socket_v) &*&
net_status(socket_v, ip, port, connected) &*&
chars(buf, len, _) &*& result <= len; @*/
void net_close(int socket);
//@ requires net_status(socket, _, _, _);
//@ ensures true;
Listing 5: Extract from the annotated network API
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void role1()
//@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values);
//@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values);
{
int socket;
char buffer[16];
if(net_connect(&socket, NULL, 1234) != 0) abort();
if(net_set_block(socket) != 0) abort();
/* ... */
net_send(&socket, buffer, 16);
net_recv(&socket, buffer, 16);
net_close(socket);
}
Listing 6: Illustration of how to use the network API
blocking communication could be easily added. After a successful call to net_set_block
the client receives a chunk of the form net_status(_, _, _, connected) and he can start
sending and receiving messages via the corresponding socket using the functions net_send
and net_receive. The contracts of these functions require the caller to have a correctly ini-
tialized socket, i.e. a chunk of the form net_status(socket, _, _, connected). The ac-
tual messages sent and received are simply character buffers. Finally, the function net_close
allows one to close a socket.
An example of how to use these functions is shown in Listing 6. A client sets up a
connection with a server at localhost (the default address if the NULL address is given) on
port 1234. Then, he sends and receives a 16 byte message before closing the connection.
3.4 Representation of cryptographic information
Here we will discuss a fundamental aspect of our extended model of cryptography: the
representation of cryptographic information generated by the cryptographic primitives and
what is considered to be public and secret in our model. We verify protocols within the
random oracle model (ROM) [1] where the cryptographic primitives are considered to be
random oracles and in Section 3.4.1 we define the type crypto_char of cryptographic bytes
to represent their results. Of course a concrete C implementation of a primitive must write its
results somewhere in memory. How to specify the possibly secret cryptographic information
in memory produced by a primitive is the subject of Section 3.4.2. There, we define the
predicate crypto_chars as a cryptographic analogue of the predicate chars discussed in the
VeriFast tutorial [7]. However, a memory region described by a crypto_chars chunk cannot
be read until it is converted to a regular chars chunk. When such a conversion is allowed
is explained in Section 3.4.3. In Section 3.4.4 we present a way to compose possibly secret
memory regions. This is necessary when a conversion is not allowed for some crypto_chars
chunk, but it needs to be merged with another such chunk. Finally, Section 3.4.5 discusses
how to explicitly clear secrets described by a crypto_chars chunk from memory.
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3.4.1 A type for cryptographic bytes
We verify protocols within the random oracle model (ROM) [1] and so contracts for the
cryptographic primitives should take this into account. In the ROM cryptographic primitives
like hashing and encryption are considered to be deterministic random oracles. So not only
the generation of random keys, but all cryptographic primitives are considered to produce
random results. As in the ROM we can assume that all randomness stems from a single source
and we model this source with a finite7 list of coin tosses. Some results of the cryptographic
primitives will be public and others secret, so we can conceptually partition the finite list of
coin tosses into a public part and a secret part. One of the main objectives of our approach
is to prevent the leakage of bytes that depend on the secret coin tosses into regular program
variables or into the program’s control flow8. Therefore we will define a VeriFast type for the
cryptographic bytes produced by the primitives that may depend on the secret coin tosses
and treat values of this type in a special way.
First, we define the abstract ghost type secret_coin_tosses from Listing 7 as the type
of finite lists of secret coin tosses. Important to note is that for a specific symbolic execution
the actual list of secret coin tosses itself is not explicitly determined. Its main purpose is to
differentiate between public and possibly secret bytes and an instance is never needed explic-
itly. Then, we can introduce the new type crypto_char from Listing 7 for cryptographic
bytes. In VeriFast a specific byte in memory is normally represented in annotations with
the type char. Within the setting of verifying cryptographic protocols values of the type
char do not depend on the secret coin tosses, but values of the type crypto_char thus can.
The definition of this type makes the dependency on the implicit secret coin tosses explicit.
Indeed, a value of the type crypto_char corresponds directly to a function that takes a list
of secret coin tosses and returns some value of the type char.
The next two definitions from Listing 7 allow to lift a value of the type char to a value
of the type crypto_char. The auxiliary function crypto_char_const ignores the list of
secret coin tosses given as its second argument and immediate returns the value of type char
given as its first. So for a given value c, the expression (crypto_char_const)(c) is of the
type fixpoint(secret_coin_tosses, char) which is exploited by the function c_to_cc
to construct a value of the type crypto_char. The function cs_to_ccs finally, lifts a value
of the type list<char> to a value of the type list<crypto_char>.
3.4.2 Memory regions containing cryptographic bytes
As already mentioned, the result of a cryptographic primitive could be a secret and we want
to prevent leaking secrets to the attacker. For this reason we are going to treat C buffers
where cryptographic primitives store their results in a special way. Permissions of C buffers
are normally tracked by chunks of the predicate chars as declared in Listing 8. A chunk
chars(buffer, n, cs) for example, indicates that there is a valid allocated memory region
starting at the address buffer with a size of n bytes and with content cs of type list<char>.
The owner of such a chunk has the permission to read and write the indicated memory region.
7 We only consider finite prefixes of possibly non-terminating runs, so a finite source of randomness suffices.
8 This ensures that protocol executions that agree on the public coin tosses follow the same execution path.
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/*@
abstract_type secret_coin_tosses;
inductive crypto_char =
cc_constructor(fixpoint(secret_coin_tosses, char) cc_function)
;
fixpoint char crypto_char_const(char c, secret_coin_tosses oracle)
{
return c;
}
fixpoint crypto_char c_to_cc(char c)
{
return cc_constructor((crypto_char_const)(c));
}
fixpoint list<crypto_char> cs_to_ccs(list<char> cs)
{
switch(cs)
{
case cons(c, cs0):
return cons(c_to_cc(c), cs_to_ccs(cs0));
case nil:
return nil;
}
}
@*/
Listing 7: A type for cryptographic bytes: crypto char
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/*@
predicate chars(char *buffer, int n; list<char> cs);
inductive crypto_chars_kind = normal | secret;
predicate crypto_chars(crypto_chars_kind kind, char *buffer,
int n; list<crypto_char> ccs);
@*/
Listing 8: The predicates chars and crypto_chars
We now introduce the very similar predicate crypto_chars also from Listing 8. The dif-
ference with the chars predicate is that memory regions expressed by such a crypto_chars
chunk contain possibly secret cryptographic information and such a memory region is neither
readable nor writable directly. Moreover, as a memory region described by a crypto_chars
chunk could be generated by a cryptographic primitive, it can depend on the implicit secret
coin tosses and so its content is described by a value of the type crypto_char.
Chunks of the predicate crypto_chars come in two flavors and what flavor a chunk
belongs to depends on its first argument. A crypto_chars chunk where the first argument
is normal is equivalent to a regular chars chunk. This means it is not dependent on the
secret coin tosses, not confidential and thus can be converted to a chars chunk and back with
the lemmas crypto_chars_to_chars and chars_to_crypto_chars from Listing 9 respec-
tively. Only when it is converted to a chars chunk does one obtain read and write permissions
to the corresponding memory region. Note the usage of the pure function cs_to_ccs from
Listing 7 in the contracts of both functions.
In normal circumstances (i.e. if no cryptographic collision occurs), a crypto_chars chunk
where the first argument is secret can only be converted to a chars chunk after one has
proven that its content is not secret. This important restriction prevents actual secret infor-
mation from leaking into regular program variables or into the program’s control flow. Such a
crypto_chars(secret, _, _, _) chunk can also be converted to a chars chunk with the
lemma crypto_chars_to_chars if a cryptographic collision occurs (i.e. if col equals true).
This poses no problem as we prove all our protocol properties “up to a collision”, meaning
that the proven properties only hold for a specific protocol run if no cryptographic collision
occurred (see further). The final lemma from Listing 9, chars_to_secret_crypto_chars,
allows to convert any chars chunk to a crypto_chars(secret, _, _, _) chunk.
3.4.3 Proving a possible secret is not secret
A value cs of the type list<char> definitely does not depend on the secret coin tosses, but
a value ccs of type list<crypto_char> can. So what if we can show in some symbolic
execution branch that the value ccs is equal to cs_to_ccs(cs)? Then this is of course true
for all possible choices of the secret coin tosses and thus ccs effectively does not depend on
them. This reasoning is captured by the definitions from Listing 10.
The definition of predicate public_ccs from Listing 10 expresses that for the given value
ccs there exists some value cs of type list<char> such that ccs == cs_to_ccs(cs).
Then lemma public_crypto_chars allows to convert any crypto_chars chunk (thus also
secret ones) to a chars chunk if it is given a proof that the corresponding value of type
list<crypto_char> does not depend on the secret coin tosses.
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/*@
fixpoint bool col();
lemma_auto void crypto_chars_to_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [?f]crypto_chars(?kind, array, n, ?ccs) &*&
col || kind == normal;
ensures [f]chars(array, n, ?cs) &*& ccs == cs_to_ccs(cs);
lemma_auto void chars_to_crypto_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [?f]chars(array, n, ?cs);
ensures [f]crypto_chars(normal, array, n, cs_to_ccs(cs));
lemma_auto void chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [?f]chars(array, n, ?cs);
ensures [f]crypto_chars(secret, array, n, cs_to_ccs(cs));
@*/
Listing 9: Some conversions between chars and crypto chars
/*@
predicate public_ccs(list<crypto_char> ccs) =
[_]exists(?cs) &*& ccs == cs_to_ccs(cs);
lemma void public_crypto_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [?f]crypto_chars(_, array, n, ?ccs) &*& [_]public_ccs(ccs);
ensures [f]chars(array, n, ?cs) &*& ccs == cs_to_ccs(cs);
@*/
Listing 10: Converting a crypto_chars chunk to a chars chunk
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/*@
lemma void crypto_chars_split(char *array, int i);
requires [?f]crypto_chars(?kind, array, ?n, ?ccs) &*&
0 <= i &*& i <= n;
ensures [f]crypto_chars(kind, array, i, ?ccs1) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, array + i, n - i, ?ccs2) &*&
ccs1 == take(i, ccs) &*& ccs2 == drop(i, ccs) &*&
ccs == append(ccs1, ccs2);
lemma_auto void crypto_chars_join(char *array);
requires [?f]crypto_chars(?kind, array, ?n1, ?ccs1) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, array + n1, ?n2, ?ccs2);
ensures [f]crypto_chars(kind, array, n1 + n2, append(ccs1, ccs2));
@*/
Listing 11: Splitting and joining possibly confidential memory regions
void memcpy(void *dst, void *src, size_t count);
/*@ requires crypto_chars(_, dst, count, _) &*&
[?f]crypto_chars(?kind, src, count, ?ccs); @*/
/*@ ensures crypto_chars(kind, dst, count, ccs) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, src, count, ccs); @*/
Listing 12: A contract for memcpy
3.4.4 Composing possibly secret memory regions
In the VeriFast Tutorial [7] it is explained that two separately tracked adjacent character
buffers can be merged together with a lemma called chars_join and any tracked char-
acter buffer can be split into two with the lemma chars_split. Listing 11 shows the
crypto_chars counterparts of these lemmas. A first step in creating a single memory region
from different arbitrary parts then, is to create crypto_chars chunks for the desired memory
regions with the lemmas crypto_chars_split and crypto_chars_join. The next step is
to copy these parts to adjacent regions in memory before they can be merged with the lemma
crypto_chars_join as a final step. In many C programs, and also in our approach, this
copying is done with the function memcpy from the C standard library. Listing 12 shows
a contract for memcpy that can handle crypto_chars chunks. This contract simply states
that after a call to memcpy, the content of the input buffer src is copied to the output buffer
dst and the output buffer is described by the same kind of chunk as the input buffer was
described with before the call.
Listing 13 shows a small verified example that uses all these definitions. In this example,
the content of a non-confidential buffer of SIZE bytes at location fst is concatenated with
the first SIZE bytes of a possibly confidential buffer at location snd. The result of this
concatenation is written in the buffer out. While most of this example speaks for itself, the
first statement invokes the lemma chars_limits and is required to assure VeriFast that no
overflow occurs in the expression out + SIZE. More details on this can be found in [7].
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void compose(char* fst, char* snd, char* out)
/*@ requires chars(fst, SIZE, ?cs1) &*&
crypto_chars(?kind, snd, 2 * SIZE, ?ccs2) &*&
chars(out, 2 * SIZE, _); @*/
/*@ ensures chars(fst, SIZE, _) &*&
crypto_chars(kind, snd, 2 * SIZE, ccs2) &*&
crypto_chars(kind, out, 2 * SIZE,
append(cs_to_ccs(cs1), take(SIZE, ccs2))); @*/
{
//@ chars_limits(out);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(out, SIZE);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(out + SIZE, SIZE);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(fst, SIZE);
memcpy(out, fst, SIZE);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(fst, SIZE);
/*@ switch(kind)
{
case secret:
crypto_chars_to_chars(out, SIZE);
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(out, SIZE);
case normal:
}
@*/
//@ crypto_chars_split(snd, SIZE);
memcpy(out + SIZE, snd, SIZE);
//@ crypto_chars_join(snd);
//@ crypto_chars_join(out);
}
Listing 13: Example using definitions from Listing 11 and Listing 12
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void zeroize(char *buffer, int size);
//@ requires crypto_chars(_, buffer, size, _);
//@ ensures chars(buffer, size, _);
Listing 14: A function to clear secrets from memory
3.4.5 Clearing secret memory regions
VeriFast checks that at the end of each function you have freed all allocated memory (or have
passed the ownership to some called function or to the calling function) and that at the end
of each block, all memory regions allocated on the stack are present in the symbolic heap
before they are deallocated. In a protocol participant implementation where, for example,
some secret was generated there is an issue concerning deallocation. The buffer containing
the secret is described by a crypto_chars chunk, but to release allocated memory (both in
the heap and on the stack), it needs to be converted to a chars chunk. There is however
no way to do this9 for a secret as this would allow to leak secret bytes into regular program
variables or into the program’s control flow. The function zeroize from Listing 14 allows a
protocol implementation to erase its generated and retrieved secrets from memory once the
protocol is finished. The fact that this is necessary is actually quite sensible and it can be
considered good practice to clear all secrets from memory before control is passed back to
the invoker of the protocol.
3.5 Cryptograms as the result of cryptographic primitives
Now we discuss all the definitions to symbolically represent the result of a cryptographic
primitive in memory as is required for their contracts. In Section 3.5.1 we define the concept
of cryptograms as the symbolic representation of the results of cryptographic primitives.
Next in Section 3.5.2, we explain that a cryptogram is characterized with a value of the
type of cryptographic bytes list<crypto_char>. Then in Section 3.5.3, we continue with
a discussion on how cryptograms are represented in memory and we finish in Section 3.5.4
with an explanation of how to compare memory regions that contain cryptograms.
3.5.1 Cryptograms
Before we are ready to specify a contract for some cryptographic primitive, we need a symbolic
representation of the result of cryptographic computations. We call these results cryptograms,
i.e. instances of the inductive datatype cryptogram defined in Listing 15. As mentioned
before, we focus here on the generation of random values (i.e. symmetric keys and nonces),
hashing and authenticated encryption. So in this scope cryptogram needs four constructors,
while more constructors are necessary in the full encoding of our extended symbolic model.
The first constructor cg_sha512_hash of the inductive datatype cryptogram represents
hash values and its only parameter pay of type list<crypto_char> serves to record the
(possibly secret) payload that was used to create the hash. The second and third con-
structor both represent random values and we make a distinction between symmetric keys
9 A leak statement makes VeriFast ignore a crypto_chars chunk in the heap during symbolic execu-
tion at the end of a code block, but for chunks on the stack this does not work.
22
/*@
inductive cryptogram =
| cg_sha512_hash (list<crypto_char> pay)
| cg_nonce (int principal, int i)
| cg_symmetric_key (int principal, int i)
| cg_aes_auth_encrypted (int principal, int i,
list<crypto_char> pay, list<crypto_char> iv)
;
@*/
Listing 15: Cryptograms are the results of cryptographic computations
and random nonces for clarity10. Each of these two constructors has two parameters and a
cg_nonce(p,i) or cg_symmetric_key(p,i) cryptogram symbolizes the ith random value
generated by principal p. Authenticated encrypted messages then, are represented by the
fourth constructor cg_aes_auth_encrypted and this constructor has four parameters. The
first two parameters serve to identify the key that was used and the third parameter records
the plaintext that was encrypted. The fourth parameter finally, allows for the same plaintext
to be encrypted with the same key to different ciphertexts. This is why an initialization vec-
tor is used in symmetric encryption and so the parameter iv corresponds to the initialization
vector that was chosen to create the ciphertext.
It is instructive to contrast this definition of cryptogram with the definition of messages
in a regular symbolic model of cryptography. Such a definition is shown in Listing 16 as the
inductive datatype msg. It is only shown there to compare the two representations and it is
not part of our approach. A clear similarity between these two definitions is the representation
of random nonces and symmetric keys. An obvious difference between the two is that there
is no pairing operator to compose two cryptograms in our extended symbolic model while
msg has the constructor msg_pair to compose messages. Another obvious difference is that
cryptogram, in contrast to msg, has no msg_data constructor because plain messages simply
have the type list<crypto_char> in the encoding of our extended symbolic model. The
constructors msg_hash and msg_auth_encrypted on the one hand and their corresponding
constructors of cryptogram on the other hand finally, are very similar in both definitions
except that they differ in the type for their payloads (and optionally initialization vector).
In the definition of msg this type is msg itself and so the definition of messages is a true
recursive definition. The definition of cryptogram on the other hand is not recursive since the
payload in the constructors cg_sha512_hash and cg_aes_auth_encrypted have the type
list<crypto_char>. So in our extended symbolic model, from the definition of cryptogram
alone, it is not immediately clear how to, for example, encrypt a key or compose two encrypted
messages into one message. This will however gradually become clear throughout the rest of
this text.
3.5.2 Characterization of a cryptogram
In the contract for a cryptographic primitive, we want to link the contents of a C buffer
to some symbolic result produced by that cryptographic primitive (i.e. a cryptogram). As
a first step we define the pure function ccs_for_cg in Listing 17. This function returns
10 It also prevents keys from being used as random nonces and vice versa.
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/*@
inductive msg =
| msg_data (list<char> raw_data)
| msg_pair (msg fst, msg snd)
| msg_hash (msg payload)
| msg_nonce (int principal, int i)
| msg_symmetric_key (int principal, int i)
| msg_auth_encrypted (int principal, int i,
msg payload, list<char> iv)
;
@*/
Listing 16: Messages in classic symbolic models: NOT part of approach
//@ fixpoint list<crypto_char> ccs_for_cg(cryptogram cg);
Listing 17: Representation of a cryptogram
the characterization for a given cryptogram as a list of elements of type crypto_char. It
is initially completely unspecified, but its function values are determined during symbolic
execution by the postconditions of the cryptographic primitive implementations (as discussed
further on). Suppose the primitive for random value generation outputs, in a C buffer, the
characterization ccs of a symbolic cryptogram key as Figure 4 illustrates. Then we know
ccs_for_cg(key) is equal to ccs.
In the encoding of our extended symbolic model, we chose to give this characterization
function of cryptograms a surjectivity and an injectivity property. These properties are en-
coded in Listing 19 and Listing 20 respectively as lemmas about ccs_for_cg. The injectivity
property’s main purpose is to simplify the rest of the approach. The surjectivity property of
ccs_for_cg does not only simplify the approach, it is also a very useful property when veri-
fying code that parses and interprets raw messages received from the network (see Section 4).
Before we discuss these properties of ccs_for_cg, we give some straightforward definitions
in Listing 18 that allow to differentiate between the different kinds of cryptograms. The in-
ductive datatype tag is defined there which has one constructor for each kind of cryptogram.
Since none of these constructors has any parameters, we have in fact a unique tag for each
constructor of cryptogram. The pure function tag_for_cg then associates the correct tag
with each kind of cryptogram.
In Listing 19 the straightforward surjectivity property of ccs_for_cg is expressed. The
lemma ccs_for_cg_sur simply allows to interpret a list of crypto_char as a particular
kind of cryptogram. For simplicity, we allow to interpret any list of crypto_char (e.g. also
the empty list) as the representation of some kind of cryptogram. Since we may assume that
ccs
key
ccs = ccs_for_cg(key)
Figure 4: Illustration of the intended meaning of ccs_for_cg
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/*@
inductive tag =
| tag_hash
| tag_nonce
| tag_symmetric_key
| tag_auth_encrypted
;
fixpoint tag tag_for_cg(cryptogram cg)
{
switch(cg)
{
case cg_sha512_hash(pay1):
return tag_hash;
case cg_nonce(p1, c1):
return tag_nonce;
case cg_symmetric_key(p1, c1):
return tag_symmetric_key;
case cg_aes_auth_encrypted(p1, c1, pay1, ent1):
return tag_auth_encrypted;
}
}
@*/
Listing 18: Associate a tag which each kind of cryptogram
/*@
lemma cryptogram ccs_for_cg_sur(list<crypto_char> ccs, tag t);
requires true;
ensures t == tag_for_cg(result) &*&
ccs == ccs_for_cg(result);
@*/
Listing 19: Surjectivity of the representation of cryptograms
/*@
lemma void ccs_for_cg_inj(cryptogram cg1, cryptogram cg2);
requires tag_for_cg(cg1) == tag_for_cg(cg2) &*&
ccs_for_cg(cg1) == ccs_for_cg(cg2);
ensures col || cg1 == cg2;
@*/
Listing 20: Injectivity of the representation of cryptograms
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the set of values of the abstract ghost type for secret coin tosses is finite11, it follows that both
sets of possible values for the types crypto_char and list<crypto_char> are countably
infinite. With that assumption then also the set of values of type cryptogram is countably
infinite. As there are also countably infinite many cryptograms that will never be generated
by the cryptographic primitives (due to negative principal identifiers or out of range values in
a payload) and since ccs_for_cg_sur can map each list that is not generated by a primitive
to such a cryptogram, one can conclude that this surjectivity property of ccs_for_cg poses
no soundness issues.
The injectivity property of ccs_for_cg is captured by the lemma ccs_for_cg_inj from
Listing 20. It expresses that if the characterizations of two cryptograms of the same kind are
equal, then the corresponding cryptograms must also be equal or a cryptographic collision
occurred. A cryptographic collision, signaled by the boolean function col, occurs when
during a specific run of a protocol:
• a hash collision is found
• the primitive for random value generation produces the same value twice
• the same ciphertext is computed when the encryption primitive is invoked twice with a
different key, plaintext and/or initialization vector as input
Cryptographic collisions should be extremely rare events for well-implemented primitives 12.
3.5.3 Cryptograms in memory
Now we are ready to establish a link between a symbolic cryptogram and an actual C buffer.
We do this via a predicate with the overloaded name cryptogram defined in Listing 21.
The body of this definition reads as follows: “The possibly secret memory region of length
n starting at address buffer is not only correctly allocated, its contents ccs is also the
characterization of the generated or public cryptogram cg.” The concept of generated or
public cryptograms is important for providing an induction principle for cryptograms which
is discussed in Section 3.9.
3.5.4 Comparing secret memory regions
It is clear by now that memory regions that are described by a crypto_chars chunk cannot
be read. However, some protocols need to compare possibly secret memory regions. Consider
for example a protocol where a secret nonce is generated for freshness. One participant
generates this value and sends it in an encrypted form to another principal. In some later
11 This assumption is permissible since an abstract ghost type is not interpreted by VeriFast and we can
always find a number of coin tosses which is sufficient for all fixed-length prefixes of a possibly infinite run.
12 By stating that a collision should be rare, we mean that protocol implementations that force col to be
true in all symbolic execution branches during verification by using the lemma ccs_for_cg_inj, should
have a run time complexity that is exponential in the output size of the cryptographic primitive used to force
the collision. An example of such an implementation is one that generates so many public random values (i.e.
random values with a characterization that can be converted to a value of the type list<char>) that the
target space gets exhausted; i.e. for random values of n bits, it generates at least 2n+1 random values. As the
values of ccs_for_cg are only fixed in the postconditions of the cryptographic primitives such exhaustion
is the only way to force col to be true. To cope with non-terminating protocols, we only consider all finite
prefixes of protocol runs.
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/*@
fixpoint bool cg_is_gen_or_pub(cryptogram cg);
predicate cryptogram(char* array, int n, list<crypto_char> ccs,
cryptogram cg) =
crypto_chars(secret, array, n, ccs) &*&
ccs == ccs_for_cg(cg) && cg_is_gen_or_pub(cg)
;
@*/
Listing 21: Expressing the cryptographic content of a C buffer
stage of the protocol the first principal receives an encrypted message and needs to check
that it contains the original value as part of its payload. To do this he needs to compare
possibly secret memory regions.
Our approach allows to compare possibly secret memory regions via the standard library
function memcmp. The contract for this function is shown in Listing 22. It encodes the trivial
semantics of the result being equal to zero if and only if the two input buffers have the same
content. The pure functions memcmp_part_ccs, memcmp_match and memcmp_region, and
the predicate memcmp_region are used to ensure that the contract of memcmp only accepts
comparable memory regions. Two memory regions are comparable if they can be partitioned
into an equal number of parts, where corresponding parts have the same size. Moreover, each
part must either contain no secrets or must contain exactly the characterization of a single
cryptogram so that it is compared in its entirety. This measure ensures that the running time
of a badly implemented protocol leaking a secret via memcmp, is exponential in the size of
that secret. The probability of correctly guessing a secret consisting out of n bits, is 1 in 2n
(assuming a uniform distribution) and all the cryptographic primitives ensure a sufficiently
large minimum size for the characterization of each cryptogram. So a principal verified with
our model that is implemented to leak, for example, his own secret key is expected to need
an exponential number of guesses with memcmp.
3.6 Contracts for cryptographic primitives
With all the previous definitions established, we are now ready to give a meaningful contract
to a cryptographic primitive. We give contracts for four cryptographic primitives selected
from PolarSSL:
• sha512 (hash generation in Section 3.6.1)
• havege_random (random value generation in Section 3.6.2)
• gcm_crypt_and_tag (authenticated encryption in Section 3.6.3)
• gcm_auth_decrypt (authenticated decryption in Section 3.6.3)
3.6.1 Primitive for hash generation
The first annotated cryptographic primitive we discuss is sha512 and it is by far the sim-
plest one. It is shown in Listing 23 and is used to generate hash values. The caller of
the primitive should provide, besides a valid allocated output buffer, an input buffer ex-
pressed by a crypto_chars chunk. For simplicity the contract only allows the value 0 for
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/*@
inductive memcmp_part =
| memcmp_pub(list<char> cs)
| memcmp_sec(cryptogram cg);
fixpoint list<crypto_char> memcmp_part_ccs(memcmp_part p)
{
switch(p){
case memcmp_pub(cs): return cs_to_ccs(cs);
case memcmp_sec(cg): return ccs_for_cg(cg);
}
}
fixpoint bool memcmp_match(list<memcmp_part> l1, list<memcmp_part> l2)
{
switch(l1){
case cons(p1, l10): return
switch(l2){
case cons(p2, l20): return
length(memcmp_part_ccs(p1)) == length(memcmp_part_ccs(p2)) &&
memcmp_match(l10, l20);
case nil: return false;
};
case nil: return l2 == nil;
}
}
fixpoint bool memcmp_region(list<memcmp_part> l, list<crypto_char> ccs)
{
switch(l){
case nil: return ccs == nil;
case cons(p0, l0): return
memcmp_part_ccs(p0) == take(length(memcmp_part_ccs(p0)), ccs) &&
memcmp_region(l0, drop(length(memcmp_part_ccs(p0)), ccs));
}
}
predicate memcmp_region(list<memcmp_part> l, list<crypto_char> ccs) =
true == memcmp_region(l, ccs);
@*/
int memcmp(char *array, char *array0, size_t count);
/*@ requires [?f1]crypto_chars(?kind1, array, ?n1, ?ccs1) &*&
[_]memcmp_region(?l1, take(count, ccs1)) &*&
[?f2]crypto_chars(?kind2, array0, ?n2, ?ccs2) &*&
[_]memcmp_region(?l2, take(count, ccs2)) &*&
memcmp_match(l1, l2) && count <= n1 &*& count <= n2; @*/
/*@ ensures [f1]crypto_chars(kind1, array, n1, ccs1) &*&
[f2]crypto_chars(kind2, array0, n2, ccs2) &*&
true == ((result == 0) ==
(take(count, ccs1) == take(count, ccs2))); @*/
Listing 22: Contract for memcmp
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void sha512(const char *input, size_t ilen, char* output, int is384);
/*@ requires [?f]crypto_chars(?kind, input, ilen, ?ccs_pay) &*&
[_]memcmp_region(_, ccs_pay) &*& chars(output, ?olen, _) &*&
is384 == 0 && olen == 64; @*/
/*@ ensures [f]crypto_chars(kind, input, ilen, ccs_pay) &*&
cryptogram(output, olen, _, cg_sha512_hash(ccs_pay)); @*/
Listing 23: A cryptographic primitive to generate hash values
the argument is384, so the output buffer must have a size of 64 bytes to store the com-
puted hash value. In the postcondition the predicate cryptogram is used to indicate that
after an invocation of sha512, the output buffer is a memory region linked to the cryptogram
cg_sha512_hash(ccs_pay). The fact that the input buffer is expressed by a crypto_chars
chunk, enables the generation of hash values from possibly confidential data.
The contract of memcmp in Section 3.5.4 prevented that a badly implemented protocol
could efficiently leak some secret by enforcing that cryptogram characterizations can only
be compared in their entirety. To prevent guessing some secret through the payload of a
hash, the same mechanism (i.e. the predicate memcmp_region) is used to ensure that secret
cryptograms can only occur with their entire characterization in the payload. Otherwise a
badly implemented protocol can start guessing a secret by comparing a hash of one padded
byte of the secret with a hash of a padded known value13.
An example of how to correctly invoke sha512 is given in Listing 24. There, a hash value
is calculated from the content of the buffer msg. First the lemma chars_to_crypto_chars
is invoked to convert the chars chunk that tracks the buffer msg to a crypto_chars chunk.
Subsequently a buffer hash is allocated for the primitive to store its computed hash value.
After checking that the call to malloc succeeded, sha512 is invoked to compute the hash
value from the content of the buffer msg. Finally, the heap is cleaned up by clearing and
freeing the computed hash value.
3.6.2 Primitive for random value generation
The annotated primitive for random value generation, havege_random is shown in Listing 26.
To invoke this primitive, an initialized havege_state structure is required. One can initialize
such a structure with the function havege_init from Listing 25. The contract of this
function takes a havege_state chunk and transforms it into a havege_state_initialized
chunk. Once all necessary random values are generated, the initialized structure can be
discarded via the function havege_free, also from Listing 25.
With an initialized havege_state structure one can start generating random values.
As the precondition of havege_random in Listing 26 indicates, a permission to generate
random values is required as well. This permission takes the form of a chunk of the pred-
icate random_permission as discussed in Section 3.2. The caller of havege_random must
also provide a random_request chunk primarily to pass the ghost arguments info and
key_request. Since we differentiate between keys and nonces, the caller has to indicate if he
wants to generate a key or a nonce. He can do exactly this with the parameter key_request.
The info parameter allows to associate some custom information with the resulting cryp-
13 For encrypted messages this poses no problem as a fresh initialization vector is enforced for each encryption
(see Section 3.6).
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void role1()
//@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values);
//@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values);
{
char msg[1024];
char hash[64];
/* ... */
//@ assert chars(msg, 1024, ?cs);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(msg, 1024);
//@ list<crypto_char> ccs = cs_to_ccs(cs);
//@ close memcmp_region(nil, nil);
//@ leak memcmp_region(nil, nil);
//@ close memcmp_region(cons(memcmp_pub(cs), nil), ccs);
//@ leak memcmp_region(cons(memcmp_pub(cs), nil), ccs);
sha512(msg, 1024, hash, 0);
/* ... */
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(msg, 1024);
//@ open cryptogram(hash, 64, ?hash_ccs, cg_sha512_hash(ccs));
zeroize(hash, 64);
}
Listing 24: Example of generating a hash value
struct havege_state{ /* ... */ };
typedef struct havege_state havege_state;
//@ predicate havege_state(havege_state *state) = true /* &*&...*/;
//@ predicate havege_state_initialized(havege_state *state);
void havege_init(havege_state *havege_state);
//@ requires havege_state(havege_state);
//@ ensures havege_state_initialized(havege_state);
void havege_free(havege_state *havege_state);
//@ requires havege_state_initialized(havege_state);
//@ ensures havege_state(havege_state);
Listing 25: Initializing and freeing a context for random values
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/*@ predicate random_request(int principal, int info,
bool key_request) = true; @*/
//@ fixpoint int cg_info(cryptogram cg);
int havege_random(void *havege_state, char *output, size_t len);
/*@ requires [?f]havege_state_initialized(havege_state) &*&
random_request(?principal, ?info, ?key_request) &*&
random_permission(principal, ?count) &*&
chars(output, len, _) &*& len >= MIN_KEY_SIZE; @*/
/*@ ensures [f]havege_state_initialized(havege_state) &*&
random_permission(principal, count + 1) &*&
result == 0 ?
cryptogram(output, len, ?ccs, ?cg) &*&
info == cg_info(cg) &*&
key_request ?
cg == cg_symmetric_key(principal, count + 1)
:
cg == cg_nonce(principal, count + 1)
:
chars(output, len, _); @*/
Listing 26: A cryptographic primitive to generate random values
void role1()
//@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values);
//@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values);
{
//@ open principal(p1, random_values);
/* ... */
havege_state state;
//@ close havege_state(&state);
havege_init(&state);
char* key = malloc(16); if (key == 0) abort();
//@ close random_request(p1, 1234, true);
if (havege_random(&state, key, 16) != 0) abort();
/* ... */
//@ open cryptogram(key, 16, ?key_cs, ?key_cg);
zeroize(key, 16);
free(key);
//@ assert key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(p1, random_values + 1);
//@ assert cg_info(key_cg) == 1234;
havege_free(&state);
//@ open havege_state(&state);
/* ... */
//@ close principal(p1, _);
}
Listing 27: Example of generating a random key
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togram by choosing the function value of cg_info. Function values of cg_info are important
when proving integrity properties of protocol implementations (see Section 4). The last re-
quirement imposed by the precondition then, is a correctly allocated output buffer. If the
result of a call to havege_random is successful (i.e. the return value is equal to zero), then
the postcondition ensures that the content of the output buffer is linked to the proper cryp-
togram and that this cryptogram has the correct information associated with it. Note that
in the postcondition of havege_random the second argument of the random_permission
chunk is incremented to ensure that all generated random values are linked with a distinct
symbolic cryptogram.
A small example of how to generate a key with all these definitions is shown in Listing 27.
First a havege_state structure is initialized and a memory buffer for the key is allocated.
Then a random_request chunk is created for generating a key by closing the predicate
with the chosen information 1234. Subsequently the actual call to havege_random produces
the key in the provided output buffer. After that call, the heap is again cleaned up and
two assert statements illustrate some important properties of havege_random. Finally, the
havege_state structure is freed.
3.6.3 Primitive for authenticated encryption
The most interesting primitives discussed here are the authenticated encryption and decryp-
tion primitives shown in Listing 29 and Listing 30 respectively. As was the case for the
primitive for generating random values, also for these primitives some structure must be
initialized before they can be invoked. More specifically a gcm_context structure must be
initialized with a generated key. This can be accomplished with the function gcm_init from
Listing 28. While the gcm module of PolarSSL for authenticated encryption supports multi-
ple ciphers, we chose for simplicity to only write specifications for the AES14 cipher. This is
reflected by the fact that we force the cipher argument of a call to gcm_init to be equal
to POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES in the precondition. The precondition also requires, besides
a correctly generated key, that the length of that key is 128 bits, 192 bits or 256 bits as is
required by the AES cipher. A successful call to gcm_init results in a proper initialized
gcm_context structure that later can be cleaned up with the function gcm_free also from
Listing 28.
The authenticated encryption primitive gcm_crypt_and_tag is shown in Listing 29. This
primitive of PolarSSL can also be directly used for decryption (instead of the one shown in
Listing 30), but we chose for conciseness to go for a contract that only allows encryption.
Therefore the precondition requires the mode argument to be equal to GCM_ENCRYPT. The
precondition also requires the permission to generate random values and this has to do with
the 16-byte initialization vector (IV). Since it is important to randomly generate a fresh
initialization vector for each encryption, the contract of gcm_crypt_and_tag enforces this
using the random_permission chunk. More specifically in the precondition, the assertion
iv_cs == chars_for_cg(cg_nonce(p2, c2)) forces the buffer iv to contain a freshly
generated nonce and the increment of c2 in the postcondition prevents the same nonce from
being reused. The remaining part of the precondition describes the required input and output
buffers. Since this primitive performs authenticated encryption, also a buffer to write the
14 Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS PUB 197, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
fips197/fips-197.pdf)
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struct gcm_context{ /*...*/ };
typedef struct gcm_context gcm_context;
//@ predicate gcm_context(gcm_context *context) = true /* &*&...*/;
/*@ predicate gcm_context_initialized(gcm_context *context,
int principal, int count);@*/
int gcm_init(gcm_context *ctx, int cipher,
const char *key, unsigned int keysize);
/*@ requires [?f]cryptogram(key, ?size_key, ?cs_key, ?cg_key) &*&
keysize == size_key * 8 &*&
cg_key == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
gcm_context(ctx) &*&
cipher == POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES &*&
(keysize == 128 || keysize == 192
|| keysize == 256); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]cryptogram(key, size_key, cs_key, cg_key) &*&
result == 0 ?
gcm_context_initialized(ctx, p, c)
:
gcm_context(ctx); @*/
void gcm_free(gcm_context *ctx);
//@ requires gcm_context_initialized(ctx, _, _);
//@ ensures gcm_context(ctx);
Listing 28: Initialize or free a context for authenticated encryption
authentication tag or message authentication code (MAC) is required. The implementation of
gcm_crypt_and_tag also allows some non-encrypted data, identified by the parameters add
and add_len, to be included in the computation of this authentication tag. For simplicity
our specification does not support this. The postcondition finally, returns all the updated
permissions and links the authentication tag buffer and the output buffer to the correct
cg_aes_auth_encrypted cryptogram. More precisely, the character representation of the
produced symbolic cryptogram enc_cg is the concatenation of the authentication tag and
the encrypted output. Different choices could be made here, but in the light of our injectivity
lemma and our contract for memcmp this relieves us from having to enforce a minimum
input size for authenticated encryption as is required for normal symmetric encryption (see
Appendix A). We also could have chosen to combine the authentication tag buffer and the
output buffer into one single continuous buffer and use the predicate cryptogram to describe
its symbolic content as is done in the contracts of the previously discussed primitives. For
flexibility and to support the verification of preexisting code however, we decided to keep these
two as distinct buffers. Note that the buffers for the encrypted output, the authentication
tag and the IV have become crypto_chars(secret, _, _, _) chunks. Indeed, as their
updated contents is correlated with the key and input to gcm_crypt_and_tag, they could
contain secret data15.
15 This is actually a crude measure. If both the key and input are not secret, the resulting authentication
tag, encrypted message and IV are also not secret. The complete encoding of our extended symbolic model
takes this fact into account.
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int gcm_crypt_and_tag(gcm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const char *add, size_t add_len,
const char *input, char *output,
size_t tag_len, char *tag);
/*@ requires gcm_context_initialized(ctx, ?p1, ?c1) &*&
mode == GCM_ENCRYPT &*&
random_permission(?p2, ?c2) &*&
crypto_chars(?iv_kind, iv, iv_len, ?iv_ccs) &*&
iv_len == 16 &*& iv_ccs == ccs_for_cg(cg_nonce(p2, c2)) &*&
add == NULL &*& add_len == 0 &*&
[?f]crypto_chars(?kind, input, length, ?in_ccs) &*&
chars(tag, tag_len, _) &*& tag_len == 16 &*&
chars(output, length, _); @*/
/*@ ensures gcm_context_initialized(ctx, p1, c1) &*&
random_permission(p2, c2 + 1) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, iv, iv_len, _) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, input, length, in_ccs) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, tag, tag_len, ?tag_ccs) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, output, length, ?out_ccs) &*&
result != 0 ? true :
exists(?enc_cg) &*& cg_is_gen_or_pub(enc_cg) &&
append(tag_ccs, out_ccs) == ccs_for_cg(enc_cg) &*&
enc_cg == cg_aes_auth_encrypted(p1, c1, in_ccs, iv_ccs); @*/
Listing 29: A cryptographic primitive for authenticated encryption
The contract for the primitive for authenticated decryption shown in Listing 30 is very
analogous. To decrypt an encrypted message, the IV that was input to encryption and the
tag that was output of encryption must be provided. The postcondition simply states that
if authenticated decryption was successful and no cryptographic collision occurred, then the
correct IV and tag were supplied and the output is the payload of the presented encrypted
message. Listing 31 finally, shows a code snippet that correctly encrypts a message. The
setting up of the environment for encryption is quite straightforward: a fresh random nonce
is generated, it is ensured that the input buffer is described by a crypto_chars chunk and a
gcm_context is initialized. Then the input buffer msg is encrypted before the gcm_context
structure is freed. After the heap is cleaned up, the C function in the example returns.
3.7 Public cryptograms and secret cryptograms
As discussed in Section 3.4, we verify protocols within the random oracle model (ROM) [1]
and we assume that all randomness produced by the cryptographic primitives stems from a
single source; i.e. a list of coin tosses. We conceptually partitioned this list into public and
secret coin tosses and introduced the type crypto_char for bytes that may depend on the
secret coin tosses and the predicate crypto_chars from Listing 8 for such bytes in memory.
One of the main objectives of our approach is to prevent the leakage of bytes that depend on
the secret coin tosses into regular program variables or into the program’s control flow.
As discussed in Section 3.5, the result of a cryptographic primitive is written in a buffer
described by a crypto_chars chunk. Since the contents of such a chunk may depend on the
secret coin tosses, the buffer cannot be read until it is converted to a normal chars chunk.
If the first argument of a crypto_chars is normal this conversion is easy as we know there
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int gcm_auth_decrypt(gcm_context *ctx, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const char *add, size_t add_len,
const char *tag, size_t tag_len,
const char *input, char *output);
/*@ requires gcm_context_initialized(ctx, ?p1, ?c1) &*&
crypto_chars(?iv_kind, iv, iv_len, ?iv_ccs) &*&
iv_len == 16 &*&
add == NULL &*& add_len == 0 &*&
[?f1]crypto_chars(?kind, tag, tag_len, ?tag_ccs) &*&
tag_len == 16 &*&
[?f2]crypto_chars(kind, input, length, ?in_ccs) &*&
exists(?in_cg) &*&
append(tag_ccs, in_ccs) == ccs_for_cg(in_cg) &*&
in_cg == cg_aes_auth_encrypted(?p2, ?c2,
?out_ccs2, ?iv_ccs2) &*&
chars(output, length, _); @*/
/*@ ensures gcm_context_initialized(ctx, p1, c1) &*&
[f1]crypto_chars(kind, tag, tag_len, tag_ccs) &*&
[f2]crypto_chars(kind, input, length, in_ccs) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, output, length, ?out_ccs) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, iv, iv_len, _) &*&
result != 0 ? true :
col || (p1 == p2 && c1 == c2 &&
iv_ccs == iv_ccs2 && out_ccs == out_ccs2); @*/
Listing 30: A cryptographic primitive for authenticated decryption
is no dependency on the secret coin tosses, but if it is secret one first needs to prove that
this dependency is absent. We employ an invariant-based approach for these proofs similar
to the approach discussed in Section 2.4.
Invariants are the main mechanism in our approach to prove the functional correctness
of a cryptographic protocol implementation as in [2, 4, 6]. Instead of enforcing an invariant
on public messages on the network, we enforce it on readable memory regions, i.e. memory
regions tracked by a chars chunk and thus containing no secrets. Since the network API
discussed in Section 3.3 only accepts a memory region described by a chars chunk, our
invariant indirectly holds for all messages on the network. On top of that, our invariant
also holds for any memory that can influence the control flow of a protocol implementation.
Hence only memory for which the invariant holds can leak to the attacker.
For each verified protocol implementation a custom invariant is required that specifies
what cryptographic information is public or, equivalently, non-secret. A good invariant must
encode the accumulated knowledge in each message during the execution of a protocol and
custom events (see Section 2.3) combined with the information associated with a cryptogram
(see Section 3.6.2) are particularly convenient to express this (see the example in Section 4).
In our approach cryptograms are the symbolic representation of cryptographic information,
so our invariant has to be defined in terms of which cryptograms are public. Listing 32 shows
a trivial invariant defined as a the predicate example_pub.
For a given invariant, the lemma public_cg_ccs in Listing 33 allows to prove that the
characterization of a cryptogram that satisfies that invariant indeed does not depend on the
secret coin tosses. The lemma public_ccs_cg, also from Listing 33, does the opposite. If we
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void role1(havege_state *state, char *key)
/*@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, 16, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p2, ?id2); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, 16, key_cs, key_cg); @*/
{
gcm_context gcm_context;
char msg[1024];
char enc[1040];
char iv[16];
//@ open principal(p1, random_values);
/* ... */
//@ close random_request(p1, 0, false);
if (havege_random(state, iv, 16) != 0) abort();
//@ open cryptogram(iv, 16, _, _);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(msg, 1024);
//@ close gcm_context(&gcm_context);
if (gcm_init(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, key,
(unsigned int) 16 * 8) != 0) abort();
if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcm_context, GCM_ENCRYPT,
(unsigned int) 1024, iv, 16, NULL, 0,
msg, (void*) enc + 16, 16, enc) != 0)
abort();
gcm_free(&gcm_context);
//@ open gcm_context(&gcm_context);
/* ... */
//@ assert exists(?enc_cg);
//@ crypto_chars_join(enc);
//@ close cryptogram(enc, 1040, _, enc_cg);
//@ open cryptogram(enc, 1040, _, enc_cg);
zeroize(enc, 1040);
zeroize(iv, 16);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(msg, 1024);
//@ close principal(p1, _);
}
Listing 31: Example of encrypting a message
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/*@
predicate example_pub(cryptogram cg) =
switch (cg)
{
case cg_sha512_hash(pay0):
return true /* &*& ...*/;
case cg_nonce(p0, c0):
return true /* &*& ...*/;
case cg_symmetric_key(p0, c0):
return true /* &*& ...*/;
case cg_aes_auth_encrypted(p0, c0, pay0, iv0):
return true /* &*& ...*/;
}
;
@*/
Listing 32: Example of an invariant definition
/*@
require_module public_invariant_mod;
predicate public_invar(predicate(cryptogram) pub);
lemma void public_invariant_init(predicate(cryptogram) pub);
requires module(public_invariant_mod, true);
ensures [_]public_invar(pub);
lemma void public_cg_ccs(cryptogram cg);
requires [_]public_invar(?pub) &*& [_]pub(cg);
ensures [_]public_ccs(ccs_for_cg(cg)) &*& true == cg_is_gen_or_pub(cg);
lemma void public_ccs_cg(cryptogram cg);
requires [_]public_invar(?pub) &*& [_]public_ccs(ccs_for_cg(cg));
ensures [_]pub(cg) &*& true == cg_is_gen_or_pub(cg);
@*/
Listing 33: Protocol-speficic confidentiality
know that the characterization of some cryptogram does not depend on the secret coin tosses,
then it must be so that that cryptogram respects the invariant. When initializing our crypto-
graphic library in the main function of the template from Section 3.1, the custom defined in-
variant must be provided. This is realized by calling the lemma public_invariant_init as
illustrated by the example in Listing 34. VeriFast’s module system is used here again to ensure
that this lemma can only be invoked once. Such an invocation of public_invariant_init
results in a public_invar dummy fraction chunk and all threads implementing a protocol
participant should receive a dummy fraction of this chunk as also illustrated in Figure 34.
This public_invar chunk is a necessary permission to call the lemmas public_cg_ccs and
public_ccs_cg.
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//@ import_module public_invariant_mod;
void role1()
//@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) /* &*& ... */;
//@ ensures true;
{ /* ... */ }
/* ... */
int main(void)
//@ requires module(template, true);
//@ ensures true;
{
//@ open_module();
//@ public_invariant_init(example_pub);
// ...
return 0;
}
Listing 34: Initializing the API for proving non-confidentiality
//@ fixpoint bool bad(int principal);
Listing 35: How to distinguish an honest principal from the attacker
3.8 The attacker model
The strength of the properties proven within our extended symbolic model of cryptography
depends on the capabilities of the attacker. If a protocol can withstand a more powerful
attacker, it can be considered a more secure protocol. Following the symbolic model our
attacker has complete access to the untrusted network. He can grab any message from the
network and put any message on there that he can produce using the same cryptographic
API as the honest principals. We use the function bad from Listing 35 to differentiate honest
principals from the attacker.
To allow for the attacker to send anything he can produce with our cryptographic API,
he must have the following capabilities:
• Send a part of a message he finds on the network
• Send the concatenation of two messages he finds on the network
• Leak his own generated keys and nonces
• Send a hash created from a message he finds on the network
• Encrypt or decrypt a message from the network with a key he finds on the network and
send the result
In the embedding of our extended symbolic model the partitioning and concatenation of
messages is trivial and the other capabilities are encoded as lemma function types (for more
information on function types in VeriFast see [7]). Listing 36 illustrates such an encoded
capability, more precisely the capability of the attacker to leak his own keys. The contract
expresses that if a principal is bad, the invariant should hold for the cryptograms representing
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/*@
typedef lemma void bad_key_is_public(predicate(cryptogram) pub,
predicate() proof_pred)
(cryptogram key);
requires proof_pred() &*&
key == cg_symmetric_key(?p, _) &*& true == bad(p);
ensures proof_pred() &*&
[_]pub(key);
@*/
Listing 36: Example of an attacker capabitility
/*@
predicate public_invariant_constraints(predicate(cryptogram) pub,
predicate() pred) =
is_bad_key_is_public(_, pub, pred)
/* &*& ... */
;
@*/
void attacker();
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(?pub) &*&
public_invariant_constraints(pub, ?proof_pred) &*&
proof_pred() &*&
principals(?count1); @*/
/*@ ensures public_invariant_constraints(pub, proof_pred) &*&
proof_pred() &*&
principals(?count2) &*& count2 > count1; @*/
Listing 37: The attacker implementation as a C function
his keys. This allows the attacker implementation to convert his own generated keys from
crypto_chars chunks to chars and send them on the network. The custom predicate
proof_pred can be used to give some extra protocol-specific facts to the proof of the lemma.
Since the invariant for public cryptograms is protocol specific, the proofs that this invari-
ant allows the attacker to perform his attack are also protocol specific. So to ensure that a
verified protocol is also capable of withstanding any attack from the attacker (which is the
ultimate goal of the entire approach), the invariant must be closed under attacker actions,
i.e. the attacker has all the capabilities previously mentioned. This can be proven by writing
a lemma implementation for each lemma function type that represents an attacker capability.
Only then a chunk of the predicate public_invariant_constraints shown in Listing 37
can be created. With such a chunk, the main function of the template from Section 3.1, can
run the attacker in parallel (i.e. as a separate thread) with your protocol implementation. If
the entire application with the attacker as a separate thread still verifies, it is certain that
the attacker cannot interfere with the cryptographic protocol.
3.9 Induction principle for cryptograms
In a traditional symbolic model, induction on messages is straightforward. Since the definition
of msg in Listing 16 of Section 3.6 is a proper inductive datatype, recursive properties of
messages can be specified directly through induction. This is required, for example, to specify
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/*@
fixpoint nat cg_level(cryptogram cg);
fixpoint bool cg_level_below(nat bound, cryptogram cg)
{
return int_of_nat(cg_level(cg)) < int_of_nat(bound);
}
fixpoint nat cg_level_max();
lemma_auto void cg_level_max_(cryptogram cg);
requires true;
ensures true == cg_level_below(cg_level_max(), cg);
@*/
Listing 38: The level of a cryptogram
the invariant for a recursive protocol. In our extended symbolic model the symbolic results
of cryptographic primitives are specified by instances of the type cryptogram, an inductive
datatype which is not recursive. To still allow for recursive reasoning in our model, a custom
induction principle for cryptograms was added to the model.
As a first step we associate a level with each cryptogram through the initially completely
undefined function cg_level from Listing 38. Function values of cg_level are natural
numbers and they will be determined during symbolic execution by invoking the lemmas
discussed further on. An upper bound on the level of a cryptogram can then be expressed via
the function cg_level_below. The level of a cryptogram corresponds to the length of the
longest sequence of recursively nested cryptograms it contains through its payload. It is safe
to assume that there exists an upper bound cg_level_max for all cryptograms since we only
consider finite protocols (or finite prefixes of execution traces of non-terminating protocols)
in our approach. In such a finite setting, generated cryptograms cannot be recursively nested
in a infinite fashion. The lemma cg_level_max_ expresses that cg_level_max is indeed an
upper bound for the level of all cryptograms.
Our induction principle is expressed by the lemma cg_level_ind from Listing 39: the
level of each generated cryptogram that contains a second cryptogram in its payload, is
strictly greater than the level of the second cryptogram. The base case for this induction is
implicit as natural numbers are finite.
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/*@
fixpoint option<list<char> > cg_payload(cryptogram cg)
{
switch(cg)
{
case cg_sha512_hash(pay1):
return some(pay1);
case cg_nonce(p1, c1):
return none;
case cg_symmetric_key(p1, c1):
return none;
case cg_aes_auth_encrypted(p1, c1, pay1, iv1):
return some(pay1);
}
}
lemma void cg_level_ind(cryptogram cg, cryptogram cg_pay);
requires cg_payload(cg) == some(?pay) &*& cg_is_gen_or_pub(cg) &&
true == sublist(ccs_for_cg(cg_pay), pay);
ensures col || true == cg_level_below(cg_level(cg), cg_pay);
@*/
Listing 39: Induction principle for cryptograms
4 A Verified Cryptographic Protocol Example
In a moment, we illustrate how to apply our extended symbolic model of cryptography to an
implementation of the confidential RPC protocol from Section 2.1. More elaborate verified
protocols that illustrate the full capabilities of our approach can be found in the latest VeriFast
release and a summary of that verified protocol suite is given in Section 5. Throughout the
discussion of the example, we present extracts from the complete implementation of the
confidential RPC protocol which is given in Appendix B. In Section 3 we narrowed the scope
of our discussion in this text to the generation of random values, hashing and symmetric
authenticated encryption. This is also the case for the code extracts displayed here. The
version in Appendix B however, shows the same implementation of the confidential RPC
protocol that was verified in the complete version of our extended symbolic model.
We discuss all the steps that have to be taken to end up with a verified implementation
of the example protocol. First, in Section 4.1, we revisit the protocol transcript of the confi-
dential RPC protocol, restate the security goals using events in the context of our extended
symbolic model and encode these goals in the contracts of the functions implementing the
protocol roles. In Section 4.2 we present a possible invariant for public messages that is suited
for the example protocol and we discuss the rest of the verification process in Section 4.3.
4.1 Encoding the goals of the confidential RPC protocol
The protocol transcript of the confidential RPC protocol is shown in Figure 2. As discussed
in Section 2.1, one of the goals of this protocol is the confidentiality of both mx and f(mx).
This means that after a successful execution of the protocol, only the A and B know the
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//@ fixpoint bool event_A1(int A, crypto_char m);
//@ fixpoint bool event_B2(int B, crypto_char m);
Listing 40: Custom protocol events for example protocol
//@ fixpoint crypto_char f(crypto_char m);
//@ fixpoint int A(int p, int c) { return p; }
//@ fixpoint int B(int p, int c) { return cg_info(cg_symmetric_key(p, c)); }
void A_impl(char *k, char *b_m, char *b_fm);
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*& principal(A(p, c), _) &*&
[?f2]crypto_chars(secret, b_m, 1, cons(?m, nil)) &*&
[_]memcmp_region(cons(_, nil), cons(m, nil)) &*&
chars(b_fm, 1, _) &*&
!bad(A(p, c)) && !bad(B(p, c)) && event_A1(A(p, c), m); @*/
/*@ ensures [f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
principal(A(p, c), _) &*&
[f2]crypto_chars(secret, b_m, 1, cons(m, nil)) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, b_fm, 1, cons(?fm, nil)) &*&
col || (fm == f(m) && event_B2(B(p, c), m)); @*/
void B_impl(char *k);
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
[?f]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
principal(B(p, c), _); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
principal(B(p, c), _); @*/
Listing 41: Contracts for the roles of example protocol
values of mx and f(mx). A second, but less obvious goal is the integrity of the protocol.
Participant B only accepts the first message if A indeed has sent it, and participant A only
accepts the second message if B sent it.
As discussed in Section 2.3 integrity goals can be expressed through correspondences
between protocol events. There, we defined two initial events (i.e. A→1 (m) and B→2 (m)) and
to final events (i.e. B←1 (m) and A←2 (m)). To encode these events in VeriFast we only need to
explicitly define the initial events as the final events are defined implicitly as termination of the
implementation of principal A and B. Listing 40 shows the definition of the events A→1 (m)
and B→2 (m) as the pure functions event_A1 and event_B2 respectively. For both these
events the identity of the corresponding principal should be provided as the first argument.
Having defined the protocol events in VeriFast, we can now encode the security goals of
the confidential RPC protocol. We specify them in the contracts for the functions A_impl
and B_impl that both implement a protocol role. Listing 41 shows the headers of these
functions together with their contracts. The uninterpreted pure function f represents the
response that principal B computes for valid requests and the pure functions A and B encode
the identity numbers of principal A and B given a shared key (see further). It is instructive
to first examine the contracts of A_impl and B_impl while ignoring the security goals.
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/*@
predicate example_pub(cryptogram cg) =
switch (cg)
{
case cg_sha512_hash(pay):
return true;
case cg_nonce(p, c):
return true;
case cg_symmetric_key(p, c):
return bad(A(p, c)) || bad(B(p, c));
case cg_aes_auth_encrypted(p, c, pay, iv):
return bad(A(p, c)) || bad(B(p, c)) ?
[_]public_ccs(pay)
:
[_]correct_payload(p, c, pay);
}
;
@*/
Listing 42: Invariant for example protocol
As discussed in Section 3.7, both protocol role implementations require a chunk of the
predicate public_invar initialized with the protocol invariant (i.e. example_pub) which is
discussed further on. Each of the roles also needs access to a shared key. The shared key
must be generated with the identity of A before any of the protocol roles can be started
and the associated information of that key must be the identity of B. If so, using the pure
functions A and B, both principal identities mentioned in the contracts of A_impl and B_impl
correspond to the correct principal. The contract of principal A further requires a memory
region b_m that contains the request message m and this region must comparable with memcmp
(see Section 3.5.4).
Both the confidentiality and integrity goals of the confidential RPC protocol are encoded
in the contract of A_impl. Given the request m and the fact that the shared key cryptogram
cg_k equals cg_symmetric_key(p,c), the integrity of the protocol is encoded as follows: if
the event event_A1(A(p,c), m) occurred upon invocation of principle A, then when A_impl
terminates the event event_B2(B(p,c), m) must have occurred. This implicitly encodes
both integrity properties discussed in Section 2.3. Confidentiality is expressed by the fact that
buffer b_m required by A_impl is described by a crypto_chars(secret, _, _, _) chunk.
So in order to have retrieved the response from principal B as encoded in the postcondition
of A_impl, A must have communicated the request message to B in encrypted form since A
has no means to prove that it is not public and send it in the clear.
4.2 Invariant for public messages
Defining the protocol-specific invariant is the most difficult part of verifying a protocol imple-
mentation. The invariant should allow honest principals to execute the protocol and should
allow the attacker to perform all the operations that he is capable of according to our attacker
model. A possible invariant for the example protocol is shown in Listing 42 as the predicate
example_pub. It uses the auxiliary predicate correct_message defined in Listing 43.
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/*@
fixpoint bool correct_message(int p, int c, list<crypto_char> pay)
{
switch(pay)
{
case nil:
return false;
case cons(m, rest1):
return switch(rest1)
{
case nil:
return event_A1(A(p, c), m);
case cons(fm, rest2):
return rest2 == nil && fm == f(m) &&
event_B2(B(p, c), m);
};
}
}
predicate correct_payload(int p, int c, list<crypto_char> pay) =
true == correct_message(p, c, pay) &*&
[_]memcmp_region(cons(_, nil), take(1, pay))
;
@*/
Listing 43: Auxiliary constructs for the invariant
The protocol-specific invariant from Listing 42 determines for each cryptogram whether
it is public or not. Being able to close a chunk of the predicate example_pub indicates that
the cryptogram that was provided as an arguments is indeed public. A cg_sha512_hash or
cg_nonce cryptogram is trivially public according to the definition of example_pub. This is
reasonable for the example protocol as no participant needs to send a hash or nonce on the
network, but the attacker must be able to send his computed hashes and nonces as part of his
attack. Hence the cases for cg_sha512_hash and cg_nonce in the definition of example_pub
simply allow all hashes and nonces on the network. Next, the case for cg_symmetric_key
cryptograms is defined in terms of the pure function bad discussed in Section 3.8. If any of
the owners of the key is bad, the key is public. The case for a cg_aes_auth_encrypted
cryptogram finally, makes a distinction depending on which key was used for encryption. If
the involved key is public, the payload must be public. Since all the keys the attacker has
access to are public, this allows the attacker to encrypt or decrypt any message he finds on
the network and subsequently put the result back on there. If the used key is not public, a
chunk of the predicate correct_payload is required.
The predicate correct_payload is defined using the pure function correct_message in
Listing 43. According to correct_message a message is correct if it only contains a request
m and the corresponding event has occurred, or if it also contains a response f(m) and the
corresponding event occurred. The predicate correct_payload does not only enforce that
the payload is a correct message as defined by correct_message, it also ensures that the
first part of the payload is comparable with memcmp. This enables principal A to check via
memcmp that the response it received, was indeed an answer to the pending request.
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Protocol ALOC SLOC Ratio VTime
dummy 130 90 1,44 0.69
hmac 262 132 1,98 0.68
rpc 467 175 2,67 0.81
enc and hmac 421 178 2,37 0.81
enc then hmac 407 179 2,27 0.84
hmac then enc 448 190 2,36 0.90
hmac then enc tagged 436 193 2,26 1.02
hmac then enc nested 567 231 2,45 1.46
auth enc 287 159 1,81 0.73
sign 346 181 1,91 0.73
nsl 1132 308 3,68 1.07
yahalom 1325 387 3,42 5.81
ALOC = Annotated Lines of Code
SLOC = Source Lines of Code
Ratio = ALOC/SLOC
VTime = Verification time
Figure 5: Results on protocols verified with the described approach
4.3 Verifying the complete protocol implementation
While defining the invariant is the most difficult part of verifying a protocol implementation
with our approach, all the steps up until now were preparations for the biggest task: verifying
that the protocol role implementations fulfill their contracts using the specified invariant. This
is done interactively using VeriFast. With the definitions and lemmas from the cryptographic
API, this should be fairly easy if the invariant is properly defined.
5 Results
Using the approach described in this report we were able to verify a significant number of
cryptographic protocol implementations. For now we only verified custom-written protocol
implementations and we leave tackling preexisting implementations for future work.
Figure 5 shows some statistics about the protocol implementations we verified. The
annotation-to-source-code ratios indicate a high annotation effort and this is as expected
since we are dealing with intrinsically difficult problems. However, the complexity of the an-
notations to verify protocol implementations is relatively low (this is a subjective assessment
and difficult to quantify). The motivation for this judgment is that most of the complexity is
contained in the cryptographic API. Although we have not applied our method to preexisting
protocol implementations at the moment, these initial verification efforts give some hope that
the approach described in this text is suited to verify functional correctness of preexisting
implementations.
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Protocol ALOC SLOC Ratio VTime
high-level API 4898 1656 2.96 33.86
dummy protocol 127 94 1.35 1.70
secure storage 214 123 1.74 1.74
secure storage asym 215 121 1.78 1.72
rpc 353 189 1.87 1.89
recursive otway rees 663 423 1.57 2.02
Figure 6: Results on high-level API and protocols
We also implemented a classical symbolic API on top of the extended symbolic API. This
API is very similar to the one in [2] or [6] and we implemented it to get an estimate of the
consistency and usability of our extended symbolic API. Some protocol implementations were
also written on top of this classical symbolic API and the results of this effort are shown in
Figure 6. We do not further discuss the classical API here. Its fully verified implementation
is described in [9] and can be found in the latest VeriFast release.
6 Conclusion
In this report we discussed our extended symbolic model of cryptography. The approach
presented here is a further development of the method described in [9]. As in [2] and [6]
we verify cryptographic protocol implementations, but we target preexisting implementa-
tions written in the C programming language. While our approach was developed to verify
preexisting implementations, we only verified self-written protocol implementations written
against preexisting cryptographic primitive APIs for now. Applying our approach to complete
preexisting implementations is left for future work.
Before discussing our approach, we motivated why the traditional symbolic model is in-
sufficient when verifying preexisting cryptographic protocol implementations. Instead, we
propose the extended symbolic model of cryptography for verifying preexisting implementa-
tions. After a detailed discussion on the definition of this model in VeriFast, we showed a
complete verified example. Then we presented some successful verification efforts within our
extended symbolic model. These efforts seem to indicate that our approach is well-suited
for the verification of preexisting cryptographic protocol implementations. Currently, a for-
malization of the entire approach is being developed to prove the soundness of the extended
symbolic model of cryptography.
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/*@
inductive cryptogram =
/*| ... */
| cg_aes_encrypted (int principal, int i,
list<crypto_char> pay, list<crypto_char> iv)
;
@*/
Listing 44: Extension for the definition of cryptogram
A Regular Symmetric Encryption
In this appendix we discuss a symmetric encryption and decryption primitive of PolarSSL.
We explain their semantics in our extended symbolic model as we did for authenticated
encryption in Section 3.6. The contracts of the different PolarSSL functions concerned with
regular symmetric encryption, are quite similar to those for authenticated encryption. There
is however one big difference: the postcondition for regular decryption needs to take into
account successful decryption with the wrong key or initialization vector. This situation does
not occur with authenticated decryption, as successful authenticated decryption implies that
the correct key was provided. As it turns out, this possibility of successfully decrypting with
the wrong key or initialization vector renders the semantics of regular decryption significantly
more complex.
A.1 Encryption as a cryptogram
Before we can specify a contract for a symmetric encryption and decryption primitive, we need
to extend the definition of cryptogram from Section 3.6. In order to have a symbolic represen-
tation of symmetric encrypted messages, we add the constructor cg_encrypted. Listing 44
illustrates this updated definition of cryptogram and the argument list of cg_encrypted
is exactly the same as that for cg_aes_auth_encrypted. The surjectivity and injectivity
properties of ccs_for_cg also hold for cg_encrypted.
A.2 Primitives for symmetric encryption and decryption
For the symmetric encryption and decryption primitives, we chose the AES cipher as in
Section 3.6. The C functions selected from PolarSSL that are sufficient to encrypt and
decrypt with this cipher are:
• aes_setkey_enc (initializing an aes_context structure with a key)
• aes_free (freeing an aes_context structure)
• aes_crypt_cfb128 (encryption and decryption)
As was the case for authenticated encryption, also for regular encryption some context
has to be initialized before anything else. Since we chose the AES cipher, this context is an
aes_context structure. The function aes_setkey_enc from Listing 45 initializes such a
structure for a given key and after its usage the function aes_free, also from Listing 45, can
be used to free it.
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struct aes_context{ /*...*/ };
typedef struct aes_context aes_context;
//@ predicate aes_context(aes_context *context) = true /* &*&...*/;
/*@ predicate aes_context_initialized(aes_context *context,
int principal, int count);@*/
int aes_setkey_enc(aes_context *ctx,
const char *key, unsigned int keysize);
/*@ requires [?f]cryptogram(key, ?size_key, ?ccs_key, ?cg_key) &*&
keysize == size_key * 8 &*&
cg_key == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
aes_context(ctx) &*&
(keysize == 128 || keysize == 192
|| keysize == 256); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]cryptogram(key, size_key, ccs_key, cg_key) &*&
result == 0 ?
aes_context_initialized(ctx, p, c)
:
aes_context(ctx); @*/
void aes_free(aes_context *ctx);
//@ requires aes_context_initialized(ctx, _, _);
//@ ensures aes_context(ctx);
Listing 45: Initializing and freeing a context for symmetric encryption
The C function aes_crypt_cfb128 from Listing 46 implements both encryption and
decryption. Which of these two operations is performed is determined by the value provided
for the parameter mode: AES_ENCRYPT or AES_DECRYPT. The next thing the precondition
requires is a chunk of the predicate aes_context_initialized, an initialization vector iv
with offset zero16 and an output buffer of size length. The remainder of the requirements
in the precondition and the entire postcondition depends on the selected mode.
If aes_crypt_cfb128 is invoked for encryption, the rest of the contract looks very similar
to that of gcm_crypt_and_tag from Listing 29. The precondition ensures that the initial-
ization vector is a fresh random value and it also requires an input buffer to encrypt. The
postcondition returns all the permissions from the precondition and ensures that the result-
ing output buffer is linked with the correct cryptogram. On first sight, the remainder of the
contract for decryption is also very similar to the contract for gcm_decrypt from Listing 30.
Besides that there is no authentication tag required for aes_crypt_cfb128, the only clear
differences are the chunk of predicate decryption_pre in the precondition and the chunk of
predicate decryption_post in the postcondition. The purpose of these predicate chunks is
discussed next.
16 We chose to annotate the stream cipher primitive aes_crypt_cfb128 as if it was a primitive for
encrypting a single message of any size, without allowing the updated initialization vector to be used for a
subsequent encryption. The advantage in doing so, instead of annotating e.g. the cipher block chaining prim-
itive aes_crypt_cbc, is that the contracts do not have to deal with the complexity of padding (although
it would be perfectly possible to do so).
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#define AES_ENCRYPT 1
#define AES_DECRYPT 0
#define MIN_DEC_SIZE 10
int aes_crypt_cfb128(aes_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
size_t *iv_off, char *iv, const char *input, char *output);
/*@ requires
mode == AES_ENCRYPT || mode == AES_DECRYPT &*&
aes_context_initialized(ctx, ?p1, ?c1) &*&
// AES only supports an iv with a length of 16 bytes
// only zero offset allowed, not spec’ed for CBF mode
crypto_chars(?iv_kind, iv, 16, ?iv_ccs) &*&
u_integer(iv_off, 0) &*&
chars(output, length, _) &*& mode == AES_ENCRYPT ?
(
random_permission(?p2, ?c2) &*&
iv_ccs == ccs_for_cg(cg_nonce(p2, c2)) &*&
[?f]crypto_chars(?kind, input, length, ?in_ccs) &*&
length >= MIN_DEC_SIZE &*&
ensures
( aes_context_initialized(ctx, p1, c1) &*&
// enforces a fresh IV on each invocation
random_permission(p2, c2 + 1) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, input, length, in_ccs) &*&
// content of updated iv is correlated with input
crypto_chars(join_kinds(iv_kind, kind), iv, 16, _) &*&
u_integer(iv_off, _) &*&
result != 0 ?
chars(output, length, _)
:
cryptogram(output, length, _, ?cg) &*&
cg == cg_aes_encrypted(p1, c1, in_ccs, iv_ccs) )
) : (
decryption_pre(true, ?garbage_in, ?p2, ?s, ?in_ccs) &*&
[?f]cryptogram(input, length, in_ccs, ?cg) &*&
cg == cg_aes_encrypted(?p3, ?c3, ?out_ccs3, ?iv_ccs3) &*&
ensures
( aes_context_initialized(ctx, p1, c1) &*&
[f]cryptogram(input, length, in_ccs, cg) &*&
u_integer(iv_off, _) &*&
crypto_chars(?kind, output, length, ?out_ccs) &*&
// content of updated iv is correlated with output
crypto_chars(join_kinds(iv_kind, kind), iv, 16, _) &*&
decryption_post(true, ?garbage_out,
p2, s, p1, c1, out_ccs) &*&
garbage_out == (garbage_in || p1 != p3 ||
c1 != c3 || iv_ccs != iv_ccs3) &*&
result != 0 || garbage_out ?
kind == normal
:
kind == secret && out_ccs == out_ccs3 )
); @*/
//@ ensures true;
Listing 46: A cryptographic primitive for encryption and decryption
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prefix KNOWN_VALUE suffix
prefix CG(_, prefix ++ suffix, _) suffix
Figure 7: Illustration of the structure of a payload
A.3 Decryption with the wrong key or initialization vector
Before we define the predicates decryption_pre and decryption_post itself, it is instruc-
tive to know what their high-level purpose is. These predicates and all the definitions that
follow here, conspire to encode the following observation for unauthenticated decryption:
Successful unauthenticated decryption by itself does not convey any information about the
provided key. If however, during some protocol run, one expects the decrypted payload to
have a specific structure and it turns out that this expectation was fulfilled, then the
encrypted message must have been created with the key or a cryptographic collision occurred.
This observation makes sense as for any secure cipher it should be very hard to construct
(without using encryption) a ciphertext that decrypts to a payload with a specific structure.
What we mean by a payload having a specific structure is defined next.
Structure of a payload While other and more elaborate interpretations of the concept of
structure are perfectly possible, we chose for the interpretation illustrated in Figure 7. Here,
two messages are depicted, each with a different kind of structure:
1. The message contains a known value: KNOWN_VALUE.
2. Some part of the message is a characterization of a cryptogram that has itself as a
payload the concatenation of the rest of the message (i.e. prefix ++ suffix).
A protocol participant that wants to perform unauthenticated decryption can express
both these kinds of expectations about the resulting payload using the inductive datatype
structure from Listing 47. To actually prove that a specific payload has some structure, the
predicate has_structure can be used. This predicate precisely encodes the requirements
for a list of crypto_char ccs to have the structure s. Some minimal sizes are required to
ensure that guessing a structure would become infeasible (see further). If one is able to close
a chunk of the predicate has_structure with the arguments ccs and s, then one knows
that the list ccs has the structure s according to our model.
Decrypted payload that follows expectation If a protocol participant sees that a
decrypted payload fulfills his expectations, then it must have been encrypted with the same
key and initialization vector or a cryptographic collision occurred. To encode this fact we
add the definitions from Listing 48. A chunk of the predicate decryption_garbage should
be returned in the postcondition of any unauthenticated decryption function (and thus in
the body of the predicate decryption_post, see further). As its name suggests, it should
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/*@
inductive structure =
| known_value(int offset, list<crypto_char> ccs_known)
| cryptogram_with_payload(int offset, int length)
;
predicate has_structure(list<crypto_char> ccs, structure s) =
exists(pair(?prefix, ?suffix)) &*&
switch(s)
{
case known_value(offset, ccs_known):
return ccs == append(prefix, append(ccs_known, suffix)) &*&
length(ccs_known) >= MIN_DEC_SIZE &*&
length(prefix) == offset;
case cryptogram_with_payload(offset, length):
return exists(?cg) &*& cg_payload(cg) == some(?ccs_pay) &*&
ccs == append(prefix, append(ccs_for_cg(cg), suffix)) &*&
ccs_pay == append(prefix, suffix) &*&
length(ccs_pay) >= MIN_DEC_SIZE &*&
length == length(ccs_for_cg(cg)) &*&
length >= MIN_DEC_SIZE &*&
length(prefix) == offset;
};
@*/
Listing 47: Describing the structure of some payload
/*@
predicate decryption_garbage(bool sym, int principal, structure s,
int p_key, int c_key, list<crypto_char> cs_out);
lemma void decryption_garbage(char *b, int n, structure s);
requires decryption_garbage(?sym, ?p, s, ?p_k, ?c_k, ?ccs) &*&
col ? true : [_]has_structure(ccs, s);
ensures decryption_permission(p) &*& true == col;
@*/
Listing 48: A badly decrypted payload has the expected structure
only be returned in the symbolic execution branch of the postcondition where the wrong key
or initialization vector was provided. After decryption and once proven that the involved
payload has the expected structure, the lemma decryption_garbage allows to prove that a
cryptographic collision indeed occurred if the wrong key or initialization vector was provided.
For simplicity we left out the concept of key classifiers in Listing 48. To support the
complete attacker model from Section 3.8, the lemma decryption_garbage should, for some
keys, require no proof of structure. A collision is then also not ensured in the postcondition.
One example of such keys are the keys of the attacker, since in general he will have no idea
what the structure of the decrypted payload will be during his attack. For each protocol
implementation, keys are thus classified in two distinct sets by a protocol-dependent key
classifier. For one of these sets the lemma decryption_garbage has the behavior shown in
Listing 48, for the other set it will have the trivial behavior just discussed. The examples in
the full encoding of our extended symbolic model illustrate this concept of key classifiers.
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/*@
predicate decryption_pre(bool sym, bool garbage, int p,
structure s, list<crypto_char> ccs_in) =
!garbage ?
decryption_permission(p)
:
decryption_garbage(sym, p, s, _, _, ?ccs_out) &*&
exists(pair(?prefix, ?suffix)) &*&
ccs_out == append(prefix, append(ccs_in, suffix))
;
predicate decryption_post(bool sym, bool garbage, int p,
structure s, int p_key, int c_key,
list<crypto_char> ccs_out) =
!garbage ?
decryption_permission(p)
:
decryption_garbage(sym, p, s, p_key, c_key, ccs_out)
;
@*/
Listing 49: Predicates decryption_pre and decryption_post
Decryption permission As discussed in Section 3.2, a principal identity contains amongst
other things the permission to perform unauthenticated decryption and this permission plays
an important role here. Attentive readers already saw this permission popping up in the
postcondition of decryption_garbage from Listing 48. This is because after a decryption
with the wrong key or initialization vector, the permission should be revoked until one proves
that the decrypted payload has the expected structure. So the precondition of any unauthen-
ticated decryption function should require this permission (and thus it should be present in
the body of decryption_pre, see further). The main reason for temporarily revoking this
permission is to prevent a principal from decrypting a message twice, in which case he can
use the result of the first decryption to formulate his expectation for the second decryption.
The predicates decryption_pre and decryption_post Listing 49 shows the definitions
of decryption_pre and decryption_post. We will now explain these predicate definitions
step by step. The first parameter of both predicates has the type bool and is named sym. It
indicates if the predicates are used for symmetric or asymmetric decryption. The distinction
between these two is not strictly necessary, but it prevents confusion between the contracts
for symmetric and asymmetric decryption.
An initial invocation of aes_crypt_cfb128 is performed with a chunk of the predicate
decryption_pre where the garbage argument is false. Its body then specifies that a
decryption permission is required. As one can see in the definition of decryption_post,
this permissions is simply returned in the postcondition of aes_crypt_cfb128, if the input
was no garbage and the provided key and initialization vector were the correct ones. If the
input is garbage or if the provided key or initialization vector was not correct, a chunk of the
predicate decryption_garbage is returned. After checking that the decrypted payload has
the expected structure, one can invoke the lemma decryption_garbage from Listing 48 to
retrieve the decryption permission and to proof that a collision has occurred.
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The until now undiscussed, second part of decryption_pre, is only relevant for protocol
implementations that use some form of nested encryption. Indeed, suppose that in a specific
protocol, a participant needs to decrypt a message two times in a row before he can inspect
the resulting payload. The definition of the predicate decryption_pre allows for this, since
in the symbolic execution branch where the first decryption was performed with the wrong
key or initialization vector, a chunk of the predicate decryption_pre can still be produced
for the second decryption. The initial expectation about the structure of the decrypted
payload that was fixed in the decryption_pre chunk before the first decryption, is simply
passed on to the final decryption_post chunk after the second decryption. So if the final
decrypted payload has the initial expected structure, the lemma decryption_garbage from
Listing 48 can be invoked to retrieve the decryption permission. Note that it is no problem
if the second decryption is only performed on some part of the result of the first decryption.
The examples in the latest VeriFast release illustrate this feature.
B Complete verified example
This appendix lists all the source files of the verified protocol implementation discussed in
Section 4.
B.1 Header file of the verified protocol implementation
#ifndef EXAMPLE_H
#define EXAMPLE_H
#include "polarssl_definitions.h"
#define KEY_SIZE 32
#define PORT 123456
/*@
fixpoint bool event_A1(int A, crypto_char m);
fixpoint bool event_B2(int B, crypto_char m);
fixpoint int A(int p, int c)
{ return p; }
fixpoint int B(int p, int c)
{ return cg_info(cg_symmetric_key(p, c)); }
fixpoint crypto_char f(crypto_char cc);
fixpoint bool correct_message(int p, int c, list<crypto_char> pay)
{
switch(pay)
{
case nil:
return false;
case cons(m, rest1):
return switch(rest1)
{
case nil:
return event_A1(A(p, c), m);
case cons(fm, rest2):
return rest2 == nil && fm == f(m) &&
event_B2(B(p, c), m);
};
}
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}predicate correct_payload(int p, int c, list<crypto_char> pay) =
true == correct_message(p, c, pay) &*&
[_]memcmp_region(cons(_, nil), take(1, pay))
;
predicate example_pub(cryptogram cg) =
switch (cg)
{
case cg_nonce(p, c):
return true;
case cg_symmetric_key(p, c):
return bad(A(p, c)) || bad(B(p, c));
case cg_sha512_hash(pay):
return true;
case cg_aes_auth_encrypted(p, c, pay, iv):
return bad(A(p, c)) || bad(B(p, c)) ?
[_]public_ccs(pay)
:
[_]correct_payload(p, c, pay);
// following constructors are not described in this technical report
case cg_sha512_hmac(p, c, pay):
return [_]public_ccs(pay);
case cg_aes_encrypted(p, c, pay, iv):
return [_]public_ccs(pay);
case cg_rsa_public_key(p, c):
return true;
case cg_rsa_private_key(p, c):
return true;
case cg_rsa_encrypted(p, c, pay, ent):
return [_]public_ccs(pay);
case cg_rsa_signature(p, c, pay, ent):
return [_]public_ccs(pay);
};
@*/
void A_impl(char *k, char *b_m, char *b_fm);
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*& principal(A(p, c), _) &*&
[?f2]crypto_chars(secret, b_m, 1, cons(?m, nil)) &*&
[_]memcmp_region(cons(_, nil), cons(m, nil)) &*&
chars(b_fm, 1, _) &*&
!bad(A(p, c)) && !bad(B(p, c)) && event_A1(A(p, c), m); @*/
/*@ ensures [f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
principal(A(p, c), _) &*&
[f2]crypto_chars(secret, b_m, 1, cons(m, nil)) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, b_fm, 1, cons(?fm, nil)) &*&
col || (fm == f(m) && event_B2(B(p, c), m)); @*/
void B_impl(char *k);
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
[?f]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
principal(B(p, c), _); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
principal(B(p, c), _); @*/
/*@
fixpoint bool example_public_key(int p, int c, bool symmetric)
{ return !symmetric || bad(A(p, c)) || bad(B(p, c)); }
predicate example_proof_pred() = true;
PUBLIC_INVARIANT_PROOFS(example)
DECRYPTION_PROOFS(example)
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@*/
#endif
B.2 Source file of the verified protocol implementation
#include "example.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#define MSG1_SIZE 33
#define MSG2_SIZE 34
void get_iv(havege_state *state, char *iv)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
random_permission(?p, ?c) &*& chars(iv, 16, _);@*/
/*@ ensures havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
random_permission(p, c + 1) &*&
crypto_chars(normal, iv, 16, ?ccs) &*&
ccs == ccs_for_cg(cg_nonce(p, c + 1));@*/
{
//@ close random_request(p, 0, false);
if (havege_random(state, iv, 16) == 0)
{
//@ open cryptogram(iv, 16, ?ccs_iv, ?cg_iv);
//@ close cryptogram(iv, 16, ccs_iv, cg_iv);
//@ close example_pub(cg_iv);
//@ leak example_pub(cg_iv);
// This lemma takes a cryptogram that is public to a chars chunk.
// It is part of the complete encoding of the extended model of cryptoraphy
// and can easily be proven with the lemma’s discussed in this report
//@ public_cryptogram(iv, cg_iv);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(iv, 16);
return;
}
abort();
}
void encrypt(havege_state *state, char *k, char *in, int in_size, char *out)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?p0, _) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
[?f2]crypto_chars(?kind, in, in_size, ?in_ccs) &*&
chars(out, in_size + 32, _) &*&
col || bad(A(p, c)) || bad(B(p, c)) ?
kind == normal
:
[_]correct_payload(p, c, in_ccs); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(p0, _) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
[f2]crypto_chars(kind, in, in_size, in_ccs) &*&
chars(out, in_size + 32, _); @*/
{
char iv[16];
char mac[16];
gcm_context context;
//@ open principal(p0, _);
//@ chars_limits(out);
get_iv(state, iv);
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//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(out, 16);
memcpy(out, iv, 16);
//@ close gcm_context(&context);
if (gcm_init(&context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, k,
(unsigned int) KEY_SIZE * 8) != 0) abort();
if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&context, GCM_ENCRYPT, (unsigned int) in_size,
iv, 16, NULL, 0, in, out + 32,
16, out + 16) != 0)
abort();
//@ assert exists(?enc_cg);
//@ crypto_chars_join(out + 16);
//@ close cryptogram(out + 16, 16 + in_size, ?enc_ccs, enc_cg);
/*@ if (!col)
{
switch(kind)
{
case normal:
public_ccs(in, in_size);
case secret:
}
close example_pub(enc_cg);
leak example_pub(enc_cg);
public_cryptogram(out + 16, enc_cg);
}
else
{
open cryptogram(out + 16, 16 + in_size, enc_ccs, enc_cg);
crypto_chars_to_chars(out + 16, 16 + in_size);
}
@*/
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(out, 16);
//@ chars_join(out);
gcm_free(&context);
//@ open gcm_context(&context);
zeroize(iv, 16);
//@ close principal(p0, _);
}
void decrypt(char *k, char *in, char *out, int out_size)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?p0, _) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
chars(in, out_size + 32, ?in_ccs) &*&
chars(out, out_size, _); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(p0, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
chars(in, out_size + 32, in_ccs) &*&
crypto_chars(?kind, out, out_size, ?out_ccs) &*&
col || bad(A(p, c)) || bad(B(p, c)) ?
kind == normal
:
kind == secret &*&
[_]correct_payload(p, c, out_ccs); @*/
{
char iv[16];
char mac[16];
gcm_context context;
//@ open principal(p0, _);
//@ chars_limits(in);
//@ close [1/2]hide_chars(in, out_size + 32, in_ccs);
//@ chars_split(in, 16);
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//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(in, 16);
//@ interpret_auth_encrypted(in + 16, 16 + out_size);
//@ open [1/2]cryptogram(in + 16, 16 + out_size, ?ccs, ?enc_cg);
//@ close [1/2]cryptogram(in + 16, 16 + out_size, ccs, enc_cg);
//@ public_cryptogram(in + 16, enc_cg);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(in + 16, 16 + out_size);
//@ crypto_chars_split(in + 16, 16);
//@ assert [1/2]crypto_chars(normal, in, 16, ?iv_ccs);
//@ assert [1/2]crypto_chars(normal, in + 16, 16, ?mac_ccs);
//@ assert [1/2]crypto_chars(normal, in + 32, out_size, ?enc_ccs);
//@ assert ccs == append(mac_ccs, enc_ccs);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(iv, 16);
memcpy(iv, in, 16);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(mac, 16);
memcpy(mac, in + 16, 16);
//@ close gcm_context(&context);
if (gcm_init(&context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, k,
(unsigned int) KEY_SIZE * 8) != 0) abort();
//@ close exists(enc_cg);
//@ assert gcm_context_initialized(&context, p, c);
if (gcm_auth_decrypt(&context, (unsigned int) out_size,
iv, 16, NULL, 0, mac, 16,
in + 32, out) != 0)
abort();
//@ assert [1/2]crypto_chars(secret, out, out_size, ?out_ccs);
//@ open [_]example_pub(enc_cg);
/*@ if (col || bad(A(p, c)) || bad(B(p, c)))
{
if (col)
crypto_chars_to_chars(out, out_size);
else
public_crypto_chars(out, out_size);
chars_to_crypto_chars(out, out_size);
}
@*/
// Cleanup
gcm_free(&context);
//@ open gcm_context(&context);
zeroize(iv, 16);
//@ close principal(p0, _);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(mac, 16);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(in, 16);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(in + 16, 16);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(in + 32, out_size);
//@ chars_join(in);
//@ chars_join(in);
//@ open [1/2]hide_chars(in, out_size + 32, in_ccs);
}
void A_impl(char *k, char *b_m, char *b_fm)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*& principal(A(p, c), _) &*&
[?f2]crypto_chars(secret, b_m, 1, cons(?m, nil)) &*&
[_]memcmp_region(cons(_, nil), cons(m, nil)) &*&
chars(b_fm, 1, _) &*&
!bad(A(p, c)) && !bad(B(p, c)) && event_A1(A(p, c), m); @*/
/*@ ensures [f1]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
principal(A(p, c), _) &*&
[f2]crypto_chars(secret, b_m, 1, cons(m, nil)) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, b_fm, 1, cons(?fm, nil)) &*&
col || (fm == f(m) && event_B2(B(p, c), m)); @*/
{
int socket;
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havege_state havege_state;
net_usleep(20000);
if(net_connect(&socket, NULL, PORT) != 0)
abort();
if(net_set_block(socket) != 0)
abort();
//@ close havege_state(&havege_state);
havege_init(&havege_state);
{
char msg1[MSG1_SIZE];
char msg2[MSG2_SIZE];
char mfm[2];
/*@ if (col)
{
crypto_chars_to_chars(b_m, 1);
chars_to_crypto_chars(b_m, 1);
}
else
{
close correct_payload(p, c, cons(m, nil));
leak correct_payload(p, c, cons(m, nil));
}
@*/
encrypt(&havege_state, k, b_m, 1, msg1);
//@ open principal(A(p, c), _);
net_send(&socket, msg1, MSG1_SIZE);
net_recv(&socket, msg2, MSG2_SIZE);
//@ close principal(A(p, c), _);
decrypt(k, msg2, mfm, 2);
//@ crypto_chars_split(mfm, 1);
//@ assert crypto_chars(?kind, mfm, 1, cons(?m0, ?rest1));
//@ switch(rest1){ case cons(x0,xs0): case nil: }
//@ assert crypto_chars(kind, (void*) mfm + 1, 1, cons(?mf, ?rest2));
//@ switch(rest2){ case cons(x0,xs0): case nil: }
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(b_fm, 1);
memcpy(b_fm, (void*) mfm + 1, 1);
/*@ if (col)
{
crypto_chars_to_chars(b_m, 1);
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(b_m, 1);
crypto_chars_to_chars(b_fm, 1);
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(b_fm, 1);
MEMCMP_PUB(mfm)
}
else
{
open correct_payload(p, c, cons(m0, cons(mf, nil)));
}
@*/
//@ open [_]memcmp_region(cons(?p1, nil), cons(m, nil));
//@ open [_]memcmp_region(cons(?p2, nil), cons(m0, nil));
//@ append_drop_take(cons(m, nil), 1);
//@ append_drop_take(cons(m0, nil), 1);
if (memcmp(b_m, mfm, 1) != 0) abort();
//@ crypto_chars_join(mfm);
zeroize(mfm, 2);
}
havege_free(&havege_state);
//@ open havege_state(&havege_state);
net_close(socket);
}
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void compute_f(char *b_m, char *b_fm)
/*@ requires [?f]cryptogram(?k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
crypto_chars(?kind, b_m, 1, cons(?m, nil)) &*&
chars(b_fm, 1, cons(_, nil)); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
crypto_chars(kind, b_m, 1, cons(m, nil)) &*&
crypto_chars(kind, b_fm, 1, cons(?fm, nil)) &*&
event_B2(B(p, c), m) && fm == f(m); @*/
{
//@ open chars(b_fm, 1, cons(_, nil));
b_fm[0] = ’x’;
//@ open chars(b_fm, 1, cons(’x’, nil));
/*@ switch(kind)
{
case secret:
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(b_fm, 1);
case normal:
chars_to_crypto_chars(b_fm, 1);
}
@*/
//@ assume (f(m) == c_to_cc(’x’));
//@ assume (event_B2(B(p, c), m));
}
void B_impl(char *k)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
[?f]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
principal(B(p, c), _); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, k_ccs, k_cg) &*&
principal(B(p, c), _); @*/
{
int socket1;
int socket2;
havege_state havege_state;
if(net_bind(&socket1, NULL, PORT) != 0)
abort();
if(net_accept(socket1, &socket2, NULL) != 0)
abort();
if(net_set_block(socket2) != 0)
abort();
//@ close havege_state(&havege_state);
havege_init(&havege_state);
{
char msg1[MSG1_SIZE];
char msg2[MSG2_SIZE];
char mfm[2];
//@ open principal(B(p, c), _);
net_recv(&socket2, msg1, MSG1_SIZE);
//@ close principal(B(p, c), _);
//@ chars_split(mfm, 1);
decrypt(k, msg1, mfm, 1);
//@ assert crypto_chars(?kind, mfm, 1, cons(?m, ?rest1));
//@ switch(rest1){ case cons(x0,xs0): case nil: }
//@ assert chars((void*) mfm + 1, 1, cons(_, ?rest2));
//@ switch(rest2){ case cons(x0,xs0): case nil: }
compute_f(mfm, (void*) mfm + 1);
//@ crypto_chars_join(mfm);
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//@ assert crypto_chars(kind, mfm, 2, cons(m, cons(?fm, nil)));
/*@ if (!col && !bad(A(p, c)) && !bad(B(p, c)))
{
open [_]correct_payload(p, c, cons(m, nil));
close correct_payload(p, c, cons(m, cons(fm, nil)));
leak correct_payload(p, c, cons(m, cons(fm, nil)));
}
@*/
encrypt(&havege_state, k, mfm, 2, msg2);
net_send(&socket2, msg2, MSG2_SIZE);
zeroize(mfm, 2);
}
havege_free(&havege_state);
//@ open havege_state(&havege_state);
net_close(socket2);
net_close(socket1);
}
B.3 Main function that executes the verified protocol
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "example.h"
#define NB_OF_RUNS 10
//@ import_module public_invariant_mod;
//@ import_module principals_mod;
//@ import_module decryption_mod;
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(void *data, any info) =
[_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?bad_one, _) &*& true == bad(bad_one) &*&
public_invariant_constraints(example_pub, example_proof_pred) &*&
[_]decryption_key_classifier(example_public_key) &*&
is_public_key_classifier(_, example_pub, example_public_key,
example_proof_pred);
@*/
void *attacker_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(data, ?info);
//@ ensures false;
{
while(true)
//@ invariant pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(data, info);
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(data, info);
//@ close example_proof_pred();
attacker();
//@ open example_proof_pred();
//@ close pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(data, info);
}
return 0;
}
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(A_t)(void *data, any info) =
[_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
[1/2]cryptogram(data, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
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principal(A(p, c), _) &*& info == none;
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(A_t)(void *data, any info) =
[1/2]cryptogram(data, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
principal(A(p, c), _) &*& info == none;
@*/
void *A_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(A_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(A_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(A_t)(data, x);
char b_m[1];
char b_fm[1];
//@ assert chars(b_m, 1, cons(?m, ?rs));
//@ switch(rs) { case cons(r0, rs0): case nil: }
//@ public_cs(cons(m, nil));
//@ MEMCMP_CCS(cs_to_ccs(cons(m, nil)))
//@ chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(b_m, 1);
//@ assert [1/2]cryptogram(data, _, _, cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c));
//@ assume (!bad(A(p, c)) && !bad(B(p, c)) && event_A1(A(p, c), c_to_cc(m)));
A_impl(data, b_m, b_fm);
zeroize(b_fm, 1);
//@ public_crypto_chars(b_m, 1);
//@ close pthread_run_post(A_t)(data, x);
return 0;
}
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(B_t)(void *data, any info) =
[_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
[1/2]cryptogram(data, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
principal(B(p, c), _) &*& info == none;
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(B_t)(void *data, any info) =
[1/2]cryptogram(data, KEY_SIZE, ?k_ccs, ?k_cg) &*&
k_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
principal(B(p, c), _) &*& info == none;
@*/
void *B_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(B_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(B_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(B_t)(data, x);
B_impl(data);
//@ close pthread_run_post(B_t)(data, x);
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) //@ : main_full(main_app)
//@ requires module(main_app, true);
//@ ensures true;
{
pthread_t a_thread;
havege_state havege_state;
//@ open_module();
//@ PUBLIC_INVARIANT_CONSTRAINTS(example)
//@ public_invariant_init(example_pub);
//@ decryption_init(example_public_key);
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//@ DECRYPTION_CONSTRAINTS(example)
//@ principals_init();
//@ int attacker = principal_create();
//@ close havege_state(&havege_state);
havege_init(&havege_state);
//@ assume (bad(attacker));
//@ close pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(NULL, some(attacker));
pthread_create(&a_thread, NULL, &attacker_t, NULL);
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, attacker_t, NULL, some(attacker));
#ifdef EXEC
int i = 0;
while (i++ < NB_OF_RUNS)
#else
while (true)
#endif
/*@ invariant [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
havege_state_initialized(&havege_state) &*&
principals(?count) &*& count > 0;
@*/
{
//@ int A_id = principal_create();
//@ int B_id = principal_create();
char* k = malloc(KEY_SIZE);
if (k == 0) abort();
//@ close random_request(A_id, B_id, true);
//@ open principal(A_id, 0);
if (havege_random(&havege_state, k, KEY_SIZE) != 0) abort();
//@ close principal(A_id, 1);
//@ assert cryptogram(k, KEY_SIZE, ?ccs_k, ?cg_k);
{
pthread_t B_thread, A_thread;
//@ close pthread_run_pre(A_t)(k, none);
//@ close pthread_run_pre(B_t)(k, none);
pthread_create(&A_thread, NULL, &A_t, k);
pthread_create(&B_thread, NULL, &B_t, k);
#ifdef EXEC
pthread_join(A_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(B_thread, NULL);
printf("Iteration %i\n", i);
#endif
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, A_t, k, none);
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, B_t, k, none);
}
//@ leak malloc_block(k, KEY_SIZE);
}
}
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